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I. INTRODUCTION
"[I]t is not entirely clear whether construction of a hearsay rule is a
matter of discretion or a legal issue subject to de novo review." "The
circuits are also split (sometimes internally) on essentially the same issue in
the context of ...evidentiary rules.", 2 In 2012, judges from both the Sixth
Circuit and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals recognized both intra-circuit
confusion and an inter-circuit split on what standard of review should apply
to a district court's determination of whether evidence is admissible under
the hearsay rules and exceptions. 3 Professor John Wigmore noted in 1904
that the hearsay rule dates back to the 1500's and that it was essentially
fully developed by the 1700's. 4 Several hundred years after the creation
and development of the hearsay rule, however, the appellate court still
struggles with whether the resolution of a hearsay objection is a matter of
law, a matter of fact, or something that is completely within the discretion
of the trial court.
The discussions on the authority split noted in the Sixth and Ninth
Circuit both occurred in 2-1 decisions at the federal appellate level-one on
April 19, 2012 and one on November 16, 2012-with the dissenting
opinion in each case emphasizing that an abuse of discretion standard
should be the proper standard of review for an appellate court in all
evidentiary rulings.5 In recognizing the confusion, the majority opinion in

I Wagner v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 701 F.3d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 2012).
2

United States v. Clay, 677 F.3d 753, 755 (6th Cir. 2012) (Kethledge, J., dissenting) (noting

circuit split on issue of what standard of review applies to hearsay rulings).
3 Id. (discussing standard of review); Wagner, 701 F.3d at 591-92 (Smith, J., dissenting)
("This circuit's case law is not entirely clear regarding whether we review de novo a district
court's decision that a statement is or is not hearsay.").
4 John H. Wigmore, The History of the HearsayRule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 437 (1904)
("The history of the Hearsay Rule, as a distinct and living idea, begins only in the 1500's, and it
does not gain a complete development and final precision until the early 1700's.").
5 Clay, 677 F.3d at 755-56 (Kethledge, J., dissenting) ("So perhaps eventually the Supreme
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Wagner v. County of Maricopa6 agreed with the dissent on one key point
and highlighted the confusion in the second line of the "Discussion" in its
opinion by acknowledging the dissent and agreeing that there is a lack of
clarity within the Ninth Circuit.7 However, the court chose not to resolve
the ambiguity and stated that the court's "conclusions would be the same
under either standard." 8
In United States v. Clay,9 the primary issue on petition for
rehearing en banc involved judicial review of a bad-acts evidence ruling
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).10 In the dissent, which called for
an abuse of discretion for all evidentiary decisions, Judge Raymond M.
Kethledge noted his exhaustive research in articulating the split in authority
on the same issue of what standard of review to apply in the hearsay
context."
Judge Kethledge not only mentions competing standards of
review from different circuits for hearsay rulings, he also demonstrates to
the reader that the Sixth and Ninth Circuit have intra-circuit confusion on
the rules by citing cases from within both of those circuits that use either a
de novo standard or an abuse of discretion standard to review a hearsay

issue.
State appellate courts have also struggled in determining the proper
standard to apply when reviewing district court hearsay rulings. Some
states, such as Nebraska and Utah, have even created hearsay-specific
standards of review "tests" because of the multiple layers of inquiry that go
into each hearsay determination.3 As recently as 2005, other states have
even overruled past cases that used abuse of discretion to review hearsay
rulings to create a new de novo review standard when reviewing hearsay

rulings. 14
Court will remind us again that 'abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review of a district
court's evidentiary rulings."' (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 555 U.S. 136, 141 (1997)));
Wagner, 701 F.3d at 591 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("We review the district court's remaining
evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion." (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141
(1997))).
6 701 F.3d 587 (9th Cir. 2012).
7 See Wagner, 701 F.3d at 587 (pointing out ambiguity in hearsay
rule).
8 Id.
9 677 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2012).
10 Id. at 754-55 (Kethledge, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 755 (expressing complexity of hearsay standard of review).
12 Id. (demonstrating confusion caused by competing standards).
13 See State v. Jacob, 494 N.W.2d 109, 118 (Neb. 1993) (overruling cases using abuse of
discretion standard to review hearsay rulings and creating two-part test); Hansen v. Heath, 852
P.2d 977, 978 n.3 (Utah 1993) (listing cases that used contradictory standards of review before
creating a new three-tiered approach). See generally discussion supra Parts V.B.4-5.
14 Bernadyn v. State, 887 A.2d 602, 606 (Md. 2005) (emphasis in original) (holding that
"[w]hether evidence is hearsay is an issue of law reviewed de novo").
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Most notably, in State v. Saucier,5 the Connecticut Supreme Court
performed a state-by-state and circuit-by-circuit survey in 2007 in an
attempt to "clarify" the standard of review that appellate courts in
Connecticut should use with respect to district court hearsay rulings.' 6 In
that case, the majority concluded that there is no "categorical" or "bright
line" rule approach to determining the standard of review applicable to
evidentiary claims on appeal and held that courts should use a different
standard depending on the context of the ruling. 17 In Saucier, three of the
seven justices were part of a concurring-in-part opinion that was written
separately only to disagree with the standard of review discussion in the
majority opinion.' 8 As noted within the concurring opinion, "[u]ntil the
majority's decision in this case, it had been 'axiomatic [in Connecticut] that
[t]he trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to great
deference"' and that "[t]his deferential standard is [generally] applicable to
evidentiary questions involving hearsay.'9
Consequently, many federal and state appellate courts end up in
one of two positions. Courts are often either confused about what standard
of review is proper for hearsay rulings or are reconsidering whether new
tests should be created specifically for hearsay rulings, with many
jurisdictions abandoning the traditional abuse of discretion review of
evidentiary rulings. At the same time, however, many of these opinions are
met with opposing viewpoints from other judges sitting on the same panel
who are typically urging for a simple abuse of discretion review for hearsay
and all other evidentiary rulings.2 z
This article will explore the unique nature of the hearsay rule and
its exceptions that have created chaos among the various federal and state
jurisdictions. The confusion oftentimes stems from the fact that trial courts
have traditionally had broad discretion to make evidentiary decisions based
on its understanding of the issues and evidence at trial, as well as its ability

15
16

926 A.2d 633 (Conn. 2007).
State v. Saucier, 926 A.2d 633, 638 (Conn. 2007) (clarifying standard of review through

state-by-state and circuit-by-circuit survey); see also discussion infra Part V.B.6 (discussing
standard in Supreme Court of Connecticut).

17 Saucier, 926 A.2d at 640-41 (concluding that no rule determines standard of review
applicable to evidentiary claims on appeal).
18 Id. at 649-50 (Norcott, J., concurring) (disagreeing with majority's standard of review).
19 Id. at 651-52 (citing State v. Calabrese, 902 A.2d 1044, 1053 (Conn. 2006)).
20 See, e.g., United States v. Clay, 677 F.3d 753, 754 (6th Cir. 2012) (Kethledge, J.,

dissenting) (advocating for abuse of discretion standard due to lower court's knowledge of case);
Wagner v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 701 F.3d 583, 591 (9th Cir. 2012) (Smith, J., dissenting)
(suggesting review of hearsay rulings using abuse of discretion standard); Saucier, 926 A.2d at
650 (Norcott, J., concurring) (stating hearsay issue should fall under abuse of discretion
standard).

2013]

HEARSAY STANDARDS OF REVIEW

to hear and assess witness testimony at the trial level.21 However, as will
be seen in this article, courts are reconsidering this traditional deference in
the context of hearsay rulings. In exploring the different levels of review
used by federal and state appellate courts, at least six different "tests" are
used to review a trial court's hearsay ruling:
Abuse of discretion standard traditionally used for all evidentiary
rulings;
De novo review as a general rule with several documented
exceptions that require an abuse of discretion or clear error review;
Two-part test that asks appellate courts to (a) review de novo the
question of whether a statement is hearsay and (b) review for abuse of
discretion regarding whether the statement falls within a hearsay exception;
Two-part test that asks appellate courts to (a) review for clear error
the factual findings underpinning a trial court's hearsay ruling and (b)
review de novo the court's ultimate determination to admit evidence over a
hearsay objection;
Three-part test that asks appellate court to (a) review legal
questions for correctness or legal error under a de novo review, (b) review
questions of fact for clear error, and (c) review the final ruling on
admissibility for abuse of discretion; and
No bright line rule at all, but instructs appellate courts to apply a
different standard
of review depending on the context of each specific
22
hearsay ruling.

After reading the conflicting opinions on this issue and after
learning that federal and state appellate courts have created at least six
different standards to review hearsay rulings by the trial court, you might
be left thinking "say what?" to express your surprise or astonishment that
the courts have not figured this out, even though the hearsay rule has been
around for centuries.23

21 See Sprint/Unitedfgmt Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008) ("In deference to a
district court's familiarity with the details of the case and its greater experience in evidentiary
matters, courts of appeals afford broad discretion to a district court's evidentiary rulings."); see
also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997) (pointing out district court's error in
excluding expert testimony).
22 See infra Part V.B.1-6 (analyzing standards and tests in different jurisdictions).
23

Say

What,

URBANDICTIONARY.COM,

http://m.urbandictionary.com/#definetermsay /20what
(last visited February 1, 2013).
Urbandictionary.com defines "Say what" as "[a] term used when a person wishes for a surprising
or astonishing statement to be repeated, or simply to show their surprise at said statement." Id.
"To accurately model the timbre of the phrase, omit a high pitch during the last portion of the
phrase in addition to stretching the "what" as long as deemed necessary by the user: Say (In high
pitch) Whaaaat?! !" Id.
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The article, in Part II, will explain the various standards of review
used by appellate courts and how those have been defined generally. In
Part III, the article will explain why trial courts have traditionally been
given deference in terms of its decisions on admissibility of evidence. The
article will then briefly discuss, in Part IV, the hearsay rule and some of the
exceptions that have been the subject of confusion for appellate courts.
The article, in Part V, will attempt to explain how the various appellate
courts have grappled with the issue of how much deference should be
afforded to trial courts' decisions to admit or exclude evidence on hearsay
grounds. Finally, in Part VI, the article will argue that this may just be a
matter of semantics, and that it is possible that none of the courts are, in
fact, in disagreement conceptually. Most importantly, the article suggests
that appellate courts might be able to create a simpler, more coherent
approach to reviewing hearsay rulings by the district courts.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Standards of review are the metaphorical hinges on the door to the
realm of appellate review; they determine just how much deference will be
allowed through the door when a case is up for review. Understanding the
purpose and application behind standards of review is a crucial courtroom
skill. Standards of review not only define the framework for appeal by
highlighting both the facts and the law of a given case, they also determine
whether the appellate court will use a plenary or deferential approach when
reviewing the trial court's decision.24 Consequently, standards of review
are, more often than not, outcome-determinative; they can "doom any
number of appeals from the start .. ,25 It would seem obvious, then, that
the precedent for a standard of review would be given great26weight and
significance by the reviewing court in its specified application.
However, in actual practice, the standards of review are not often

24 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS
OF REVIEW §

1.01, at 1-4 (3 d ed. 1999) (detailing how facts and law are interpreted under standard of review);
Peter Nicolas, De Novo Review in Deferential Robes?: A Deconstruction of the Standard of
Review of Evidentiary Errors in the Federal System, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 531 (2004)
(highlighting importance of standard of review).
25 Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards ofReview, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 233, 241 (2009) (quoting MICHAEL D. ZIMMERMAN, BUSINESS AND
COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS 45-46 (Robert L. Haig ed., 2nd ed. 2008));

Nicolas, supra note 24, at 531 (discussing purpose of standard of review).
26 Martha S. Davis, Standards ofReview: JudicialReview of DiscretionaryDecisionmaking,
2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 64-65 (2000) (discussing significance of Chevron case to judicial
review of statutory interpretation).
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given great consideration. 27 Often this is because the application of a given
standard of review is not always easily discernible. 28 As a result, standards
of review "are sometimes ignored, manipulated, or misunderstood" and are
frequently disregarded as a boilerplate insert in a court opinion. 29 Yet, for
standards of review to function properly, they must be thoroughly
understood, correctly applied, and used throughout an analysis by a
reviewing court when making a judgment on the decision of a lower
court.3 0

To understand and apply a standard of review properly, the
appellate court must have knowledge of what the standards of review are
and understand the standard of review's designated purposes.31 Standards
of review are established through a court rule, a judicial decree, a state
statute, or by constitution. 3 The concept behind standards of review is that
an appellate court will use the standards for guidance in approaching both a
trial court's decision and the issues up for review.33 More specifically, the
standard of review applied is intended to indicate the amount of deference
to be given to the lower court's procedure and decision and to set forth the
proper materials that the appellate court should look to during the review
process.34 Ultimately, a standard of review answers two similar, yet
different, questions: (1) "'How 'wrong' the lower court has to be before it
will be reversed?"' and (2) What is necessary to overturn the [lower
court's] decision? 35 When an appellate court is faced with these questions,
the most common standards of review used to supply an answer (or at least

27 See Old Chiefv. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 n.1 (1997). Appellate courts frequently
reserve only a few lines to state the standard of review without providing any further analysis. Id.
In Old Chief, a well-cited example, the standard of review for evidentiary issues was not
addressed in the opinion of the case, but rather only in a footnote. Id.
28 Davis, supra note 26, at 64-65 (describing difficulty of utilizing selected standard of
review).
29

See Peters, supra note 25, at 234, 257-58 (analyzing reasons for multiple standards of

review).
30 Id. at 234-36.
31

Id.

32 J. ERIC SMITHBURN,

APPELLATE REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT DECISIONS 7-8

(2009)

(discussing variety of ways that standards of review are created).
33 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 24, § 1.01, at 1-1.
34 Davis, supra note 26, at 47 (highlighting how standards of review indicate amount of
deference given to trial court); see also SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 7 (linking standard of
review to level of deference); CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 24, § 1.01, at 1-3 (detailing how
facts and law are interpreted under standard of review).
35 Peters, supra note 25, at 235 (quoting Mary Beth Beazley, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
APPELLATE ADVOCACY 12 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing threshold for reversing lower court's
ruling); SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 7 (describing requirements for overturning lower court's
ruling).
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a guideline) are de novo, clearly erroneous, and abuse of discretion. 36
A. De Novo
The English translation of the Latin phrase de novo means "from
the beginning" or "anew," which lends to the understanding that the de
novo standard of review does not provide any deference to the lower
court's procedure or decision.3 7 When employing the de novo standard of
review, the appellate court is placed in the same position as the lower court
and is equally equipped with the materials needed to decide the issue. 38
The de novo standard of review, also referred to as "independent" or
"plenary" review, is traditionally used for the review of questions of law,
though this is not stated by any rule.3 9 Questions of law are reviewed de
novo on the theoretical basis that a reviewing court is afforded more time to
research and consider such issues because they are not confronted with the
fast-paced trials of the lower court. 40 Additionally, the reviewing court is
considered to be at an advantage because it contains a multi-judge panel
that is capable of greater amount of dialogue. 4'
Due to the appellate court's equitable footing when a lower court's
decision is being reviewed de novo, the appellate court reviewing the issue
is provided with substantial power to reverse the decision.42 De novo
review awards the appellate court with greater authority to reverse a
decision without deference. 43 Thus, an individual bringing a case on appeal
is expected to have his or her best chances staked here.44 Accordingly, it
may be most advantageous to frame an issue as a question of law.45
However, de novo review is also occasionally applied to mixed questions,
which are questions involving both those of law and fact. 46 Confusion and
36 Peters, supra note 25, at 242 (offering standards of review for guidance).
37 Id. at 246 (articulating meaning of de novo); DAVID G. KNIBB, FEDERAL COURT OF

APPEALS MANUAL § 31:3, at 701 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing when and how to apply de novo
standard); see also Peters, supra note 25, at 246 (analyzing de novo standard).
38 Peters, supra note 25, at 246 (discussing appellate court's decision in reviewing decisions
de novo); see also SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 9 (employing de novo standard places appellate
court in same position as lower court).
39 KNIBB, supra note 37, § 31:3, at 701 (addressing ways de novo is defined); see
SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 9 (explaining historic use of de novo standard of review).
40 SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 8 (elucidating reasons for de novo review).
41 Id. (explaining rationales for exercising different standards of review).
42 Peters, supra note 25, at 266 (warning of judicial manipulation of standards of review).
43 Id. at 246 (explaining that appellate court has power to reverse trial court's decision).
44 Id. at 274 (discussing difficulty in discerning standards used by appellate court).
45 Id. at 275 (providing remedial measures).
46 SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 9 (offering that some circuits hold that standard of review
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misuse have a higher chance of occurring when questions of fact are
reviewed alongside questions of law under the de novo standard of review
because questions of fact are reviewed with deference under the clearly
erroneous standard.47
An appellate court is not equipped with the same materials as the
lower court in making factual findings.48 Reviewing mixed questions of
law and fact under a "blanket de novo standard" creates the dangerous
possibility that an appellate court could improperly reverse factual
findings. 49 Because this could change the outcome of a case entirely, it
may be wiser for reviewing courts to provide a deeper case-by-case
analysis
of which standard should apply to mixed questions of law and
50
fact.
B. Clearly Erroneous
When an appellate court reviews a lower court's decision for clear
error, it allows a handsome amount of deference to the lower court's
determinations in reaching a decision.5 ' Such deference is accorded under
the clearly erroneous standard of review because the trial court is
considered to act as the principal fact-finder in a case.52 Once the factual
findings have been made, the trial court will apply those facts to the law to
produce its ultimate determinations. 53
The trial court is given the role of the fact-finder because the trial
court is considered to be in a better position than a reviewing court to
determine the facts; the trial court possesses more experience in uncovering
the facts and observing witness testimony. 54 Additionally, independent
for mixed questions is de novo); see, e.g., Malone v. Clark, 536 F.3d 54, 62 (1st Cir. 2008)
(determining factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while mixed questions are reviewed de
novo); Rizzo v. Smith, 528 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding legal questions and mixed
questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo); Matthews v. Chevron Corp., 362 F.3d 1172,
1180 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding mixed question of law and fact are reviewed de novo).
47

SMITHBURN,

supra note 32, at 10 (warning of confusion when questions of fact and

questions of law are reviewed de novo).
48 Id. (distinguishing appellate court from lower court regarding de novo standard of review).
49 Id.
50 See In re Excide Technologies, 607 F.3d 957, 962 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding mixed standard
for mixed questions and clearly erroneous standard for integral facts). The interpretation and
application of those facts to a legal standard are under plenary review. Id. Some reviewing
courts have stated the use of a multi-standard strategy for mixed questions. Id.
51 SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 10 (explaining crux of clear error review); see also Peters,

supra note 25, at 245 (showing mechanics of clear error review).
52 See SMITBURN, supra note 32, at 10 (explaining purpose of clearly erroneous standard).
53 Peters, supra note 25, at 245 (discussing appellate review process).
54 SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 8-9 (giving trial court deference because it possesses
more
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review of the facts of every case by a reviewing court that was not present
for witness testimony or equipped with the same materials as the trial court
could lead to a greater chance of mistake.55 Also, this would be a waste of
valuable resources. 56 The trial court is naturally in a better position to view
the facts; therefore, the appellate court provides deference to the trial7
judge's factual findings and only reviews questions of fact for clear error.1
A reviewing court will find a trial court's decisions as clearly

erroneous when, after considering the evidence as a whole, the lower court
has been found, with certainty, to have made a clear mistake.58 An
appellate court cannot make a clearly erroneous finding if it would have
had a different interpretation of the facts or if it does not agree with the
decisions reached by the lower court.5 9 On appeal, however, if the
appellate court does deem a factual finding as clearly erroneous, it may not
reverse the lower court's decisions and make its own findings of fact.60
When reviewing for clear error, the appellate court is equipped only with

the authority to remand the case to the lower court "for a further attempt at
proper findings." 6 ' As a result of the considerable amount of deference
given to the lower court, it is not common for
an appellate court to find a
62
trial court's decision to be clearly erroneous.
C. Abuse ofDiscretion
When a district court's decision entails the exercise of a judge's
experience with facts and testimony).
55 Id. at 8-10 (stating reasons for trial court as fact-finder).
56 Id. at 8-9 ("[A]void the waste of resources that would accompany plenary review of facts
at the appellate level.").

Id. at 10 (highlighting appellate court's function compared to trial court); see FED. R. Civ.
PRO. 52(a)(6) (granting appellate court power to set aside trial court findings).
58 See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 52(a)(6) (stating requirements for appellate court to set aside
findings of lower court); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)
(determining when finding is "clearly erroneous"). Although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
57

has been made. US. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 395.
59 Peters, supra note 25, at 244-45 ("[C]learly erroneous review is still very respectful of the
trial court's factual determinations."); see Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 223 (1988) (finding
clearly erroneous standard of review to be deferential). If the district court's account of the
evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not
reverse even if convinced that it would have weighed the evidence differently. Zant, 486 U.S. at
223.
60 SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 10-11 (stating trial court is given deference for findings
of
fact when reviewed on appeal); see also Peters, supra note 25, at 245 (same).
61 SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 10-11 (explaining that appellate court is equipped only
with
authority to remand under clear error review).
62 Id.
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discretion, an appellate court will review those decisions for an abuse of
discretion. 63 The abuse of discretion standard of review does not (and
perhaps cannot) have a singular definition; applying the abuse of discretion
standard is greatly dictated by the surrounding circumstances and, as such,
the application of the standard allows for flexibility accordingly.6 4 While
the abuse of discretion standard provides the greatest deference to the lower
court's decision, the amount of deference given will always vary because
the reasons are numerous for allowing a trial judge to exercise discretion. 65
Theoretically, as long as the lower court's discretion has provided a
decision that falls within a range of acceptable choices, it will be allowed to
66
stand and the appellate court will not typically find an abuse of discretion.
Thus, the abuse of discretion standard, at best, is a "useful generic term...
[that] more accurately describes a range of appellate responses.,67
The situations in which an abuse of discretion occurs are often
broad and overwhelming because there is no one definition for abuse of
discretion. 6 " Thus, in general, a reviewing court will find an abuse of
discretion to exist in many different situations. The court will use an abuse
of discretion standard when a judge fails to consider necessary factors,
considers the wrong factors, applies incorrect or erroneous conclusions of
law, applies incorrect or erroneous assessments of evidence to form a

63

Id. at 11-12 (detailing where abuse of discretion review is appropriate); see also KNIBB,

supra note 37, § 31:4, at 702 (stating that when district court exercises discretion then appellate
court reviews with abuse of discretion).
64 See Peters, supra note 25, at 244 (explaining how abuse of discretion standard is defined in
numerous ways); see also SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 12 (determining when abuse of
discretions occurs); KNLBB, supra note 37, § 31:4, at 702-04 (describing when abuse of discretion
occurs); Davis, supra note 26, at 54-55, 57-58 (describing abuse of discretion when incorrect
factors are considered, or exercise or decision is arbitrary). The appellate court will find an abuse
of discretion when decision-maker considers incorrect factors or when exercises discretion
arbitrarily. SMITBURN, supra note 32, at 12. Abuse of discretion takes place when the district
court considers wrong factors, uses incorrect law, or makes a finding based on clearly erroneous
material fact. KNIBB, supra note 37, § 31:4, at 702-04.
65 SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 11-12 (explaining discretionary amount varies due to
numerous reasons for judge to exercise discretion).
66 KNIBB, supra note 37, § 31:4, at 703 (explaining possibilities of how lower court ruling
under abuse of discretion standard).
67 Davis, supra note 26, at 77 (defining abuse of discretion standard as one describing variety
of appellate responses).
68 See Peters, supra note 25, at 243 (indicating abuse of discretion as most
deferential
standard of review); see also SMITBURN, supra note 32, at 12 (determining abuse occurs when
decision-maker considers incorrect factors or when discretion is arbitrary); KNIBB, supra note 37,
§ 31:4, at 703-04 (stating abuse occurs when court considers wrong factors, uses incorrect law, or
makes erroneous findings); Davis, supra note 26, at 54-55 (asserting abuse when incorrect factors
are considered, or when discretion is contrary to evidence).
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decision, or makes a completely arbitrary decision.6 9
The appellate court's attention in reviewing for an abuse of
discretion is theoretically supposed to be concentrated on the process used
by a lower court in making their decision, as opposed to reviewing the
decision itself 70 After finding an abuse of discretion, whether actually
found in the trial court's process or not, the appellate court has the
authority only to reverse and remand the decision. 71 As with the clearly
erroneous standard of review, the decision made was based on the trial
court's discretionary power; the reviewing court was not present when the
discretionary decision was made and cannot replace that discretionary
decision with one the reviewing court would have made.72
However, the "ideal" application of the abuse of discretion
standard to the issues under review does not always play out in practice as
it would in theory. 73 The abuse of discretion standard has no concrete
definition or application to guide the reviewing court effectively. Thus, the
circumstances in which this standard applies has broadened from
examining the process used in making discretionary decisions to include
even the merits of a decision.74
A prime example of where this occurs is within the main focus of
this paper: hearsay rulings. Several states have defined the abuse of
discretion standard to apply to both the interpretation of a hearsay rule,
which is a matter of law, as well as to the admissibility of the hearsay,
which is a matter of discretion.75 Using the abuse of discretion standard in
this all-encompassing manner forces the appellate court to review questions
of law with deference, thereby placing great decision-making authority in
the hands of the trial court when the appellate court is equally able, if not

69 KNIBB, supra note 37, § 31:4, at 703 -04 (explaining ways abuse of discretion standard is
used to overturn lower court's ruling); see also SMITBURN, supra note 32, at 12 (same).
70 Davis, supra note 26, at 59 (emphasis added) (explaining that ideal abuse of discretion
analyzes merits of decision by lower court itself).
71 SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 12 (describing authority of appellate court).
72 Peters, supra note 25, at 245 (likening clearly erroneous standard to abuse of discretion
standard).
73 Id. at 249 (stating how reviewing court should apply abuse of discretion standard).

74 Davis, supra note 26, at 49 ("[D]iscretion review has come to be applied with a very broad
brush .... ).
75 See People v. Hammonds, 957 N.E.2d 386, 400 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (finding trial court has
discretion in deciding whether statements were hearsay); see also State v. Flood, 219 S.W.3d 307,
313 (Tenn. 2007) (determining trial court's sound discretion will not be reversed unless there is
abuse of discretion). Once statements were determined to be hearsay, the trial court then decided
if the statements were still admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. Hammonds, 957

N.E.2d at 400.
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more able, to make legal determinations.
D. Problems with Defining andApplying Standards ofReview
For the standards of review to function as they were intended to,
they must be understood, correctly analyzed, and applied by the reviewing
courts throughout the review process.77 The ability of the appellate court to
do so has been impeded by the difficulty in concretely defining all of the
standards of review, the lack of a clear line between determining issues of
fact and issues of law, and the indecision over which standard is proper to
apply in instances of mixed questions. 78 In light of the confusion created
by these obstacles, most courts have resigned themselves to inserting
boilerplate statements in their opinions by stating briefly which standard of
review will be used before delving into the courts' analysis.79 In some
court systems, the confusion has created intra- and inter-circuit splits.80
Consequently, the theory behind standards of review does not translate into
practice.81 To obtain an understanding of the uses and applications of
standards of review, it is important to comprehend where the confusion is
stemming from.
1. Analyzing the Definitions
Though standards of review have been in existence since the
beginning of American jurisprudence, the standards, as we use them today,
are modern creatures.
The appearance of standards of review in court
opinions is still a relatively new concept when compared to how long the
standards of review have actually been used. 83 Defining standards and their
76 Peters, supra note 25, at 243.
77 Id.

at 236-37.

78 Id. at 247-74 (emphasizing difficulties wrought by standards of review).
79 Id. at255 (explaining boilerplate resolution).
so See generally United States v. Clay, 677 F.3d 753, 755 (6th Cir. 2012) (Kethledge, J.,
dissenting) (discussing both intra- and inter-circuit split over standard of review for evidentiary
rulings).
81 Peters, supra note 25, at 247.
82 Davis, supra note 26, at 47 (describing use of standards to guide appellate review as
existing since onset of judicial review).
83 See id. (providing historical context between use and statement of standard of review);
Peters, supra note 25, at 237-38 (describing how standards were formulated and later discussed);
see also Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 385 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1966) (providing
one of earliest appearances of our modem standards of review in Supreme Court opinion). The
modem use of standards of review in court opinions did not occur throughout the United States
until the late 1950's and 1960's and only regularly in the 1980's. See Peters, supra note 25, at
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specific applications, in this early stage, has been a difficult task, which has
been complicated by the vague language and boundaries used in all
attempts to do so.84 As a result, standards of review, at best, provide only a
guideline of how much deference a reviewing court should grant a lower
court, rather than a definitive measure."' 8A
clear explanation of exactly
6
lacking.
is
apply
should
standard
each
when
Many courts have attempted to clarify some of the vagueness on
their own by creating new definitions, qualifications, or by expanding on
their explanations.87 Despite the good faith behind these attempts, most
result in creating a definition that resembles more of a labyrinth than a clear
path.88 A major problem arising from this labyrinth lies in its inability to
determine what an appellate court's limitations are in applying a scope of
review to a particular issue.89 The lack of solid, material definitions and
application procedures for the standards of review necessarily convolutes
the process for determining the appropriate amount of authority the
appellate court should wield when reviewing a lower court's decision. 90
This is already occurring in the review of evidentiary matters and mixed
questions of law and fact. The courts are now being faced with situations
where one standard of review is applied to all of the issues presented,
which allows deference where none should be given or, in the alternative,
provides no deference when deference should be recognized.
2. The Law-Fact Distinction
Analyzing the definitions of each standard of review has not been a
simple task and further analysis into the application of the standards of
review highlights some of the difficult questions the courts have been
facing. 91 Most notably among these questions is whether an issue under92
review is one of law, one of fact, or a mixed question of law and fact.

237-38.
84 Peters, supra note 25, at 248 (explaining difficulty in defining standards of review).
85 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 24, § 1.01, at 1-2.
86 See id. (suggesting that clear explanation of when each standard should apply is lacking).
87 Peters, supra note 25, at 248 (explaining abuse of discretion standard).
88 See id (suggesting that attempts to explain when to use standards have been confusing).
89 Id. at 276 (elaborating on appellate court's misuse and lack of understanding when
utilizing standards of review); see also CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 24, § 1.01, at 1-4
(describing appellate court's scope of review when analyzing particular issues).
90 Peters, supra note 25, at 248-49 (noting ambiguous language creates significant problem).
91 Davis, supra note 26, at 49.
92 Id. (explaining that question of whether issue is law, fact, or mixed is challenging).
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The law-fact distinction is the "broad basis of review differences." 93 It is
important to recognize that the standard of review for issues of law versus
issues of fact allow varying levels of deference to the lower court.94 Thus,
understanding the law-fact distinction is especially critical when an issue
can be labeled as either law or fact because the chosen standard of review
will be based upon that label and will often be outcome-determinative on
appeal. 95
Deciding whether an issue is one of fact or one of law is not always
a simple decision; it is one that is highly circumstantial. 96 When an issue
could potentially be classified as either law or fact, the decision will usually
rest on the wording or on the scope of the decisions made by the lower
97
court.
Once a reviewing court determines whether an issue is one of law
or fact, this decision dictates which standard of review the appellate court
will apply. 98 If an issue is deemed to be one of law, the appellate court
should review the issue de novo, without any deference to the lower court,
by asking whether the decision made below was correct. 99 If an issue is
deemed to be one of fact, the appellate court should review the lower
court's decision for clear error, which provides the lower court with a great
amount of deference by asking whether the decision-making process of the
lower court was reasonable. 100 If an issue is neither one of law or fact and
turns on the exercise of the trial judge's discretion, then the issue should be
reviewed for abuse of discretion, providing the lower court with the
greatest amount of deference, though, ideally, the appellate courts will put
aside the fact-law distinction and their corresponding standards of
review.

93 See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 24, § 7.05, at 7-32.
94 See KNIBB, supra note 37, § 31:3, at 702 (distinguishing standard of review for issues of

law and issues of fact).
95 See SMITBURN, supra note 32, at 8;see also CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 24, § 7.05,
at 7-32.
96 See KNIBB, supra note 37, § 31:3, at 702 (concluding that determining whether issue
is
law or fact is difficult).
97 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 24, § 7.05, at 7-32.
98 See Davis, supra note 26, at 48.
99 SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 8 (acknowledging use of de novo review for legal
questions); CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 24, § 7.05, at 7-32 (explaining that appellate courts
should review issues of law de novo).
100 SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 8 (recognizing clear error review for factual inquiries in
appellate courts); CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 24, § 7.05, at 7-32 (explaining standard of
review used when dealing with factual questions).
101 SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 8, 11 (stating standard of review should analyze procedural
and evidentiary issues).
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3. Questions of Mixed Law and Fact
Correctly interpreting the law-fact distinction is often outcomedeterminative because the distinction determines which standard of review
should be applied and how much deference should be accorded. However,
because the standards of review for issues of law and fact are very
different, there is considerable difficulty involved in dictating which
standard of review should apply to questions of mixed law and fact. 102 A
question of mixed law and fact asks, "[w]hether
the rule of law applied to
10 3
the established fact is or is not violated."
The confusion over which standard of review should be employed
for issues of mixed law and fact arises because there is no uniform test
applied to determine the proper standard of review in these instances. 104
Many circuits apply a de novo standard of review to mixed questions,
whereas other circuits treat mixed questions with varying levels of
deference. 0 5 Additionally, some circuits determine the standard of review
on a case-by-case basis, while other circuits reveal no pattern in
determining which standard to apply. 10 6 Thus, the courts have provided
little guidance in applying the proper
standard of review when faced with a
07
fact.1
and
law
mixed
of
question
4. Standards of Review as Boilerplates
Due to the lack of guidance in deciphering both the law-fact

102
103
104
105

Id. at 9-10 (differentiating standards of review for law and fact).
Id. at 9 (offering example of mixed law and fact question).
Id. at 10 (describing lack of precedent in defining hybrid category).
See Malone v. Clark, 536 F.3d 54, 62 (1st Cir. 2008) (determining factual findings are

reviewed for clear error, while mixed questions are reviewed de novo); Rizzo v. Smith, 528 F.3d
501, 505 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding legal questions and mixed questions of law and fact are
reviewed de novo); Matthews v. Chevron Corp., 362 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding
mixed question of law and fact are reviewed de novo); SMIT-BURN, supra note 32, at 9-10
(stating how mixed questions are reviewed); see also United States v. Green, 383 Fed.Appx. 301,
303 (4th Cir. 2010) (determining that court applies due deference standard to mixed questions); In
re Nortel Networks, Inc., 669 F.3d 128, 137 (3rd Cir. 2011) (engaging in mixed standard of
review for mixed questions). Integral facts are reviewed for clear error and plenary review for the
interpretation and application of facts to legal precepts. In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 669 F.3d at
137.
106 SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 9 (citing Evan Tsen Lee, PrincipledDecision Making and
the ProperRole of FederalAppellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.
235, 240, 249 (1991)) (describing how some circuits differ from others when determining
standard of review).
107 SMITHBURN, supra note 32, at 9-10 (neglecting to offer judicial explanation over proper
standard of review application for law or fact).
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distinction and mixed questions of law and fact, as well as the confusion in
finding proper standards of review, many courts have turned to using
standards of review as merely a postscript, if at all. 108 Standards of review
have become a "cut and paste" option for court opinions and offer little
analysis regarding why a specific standard has been chosen in reviewing a
particular case. 0 9 Yet this is no more helpful than ignoring the standards
of review altogether. 110 Using standards of review as boilerplates allows
the reviewing courts to present them as self-defining and, sometimes, selfapplying."' If the previous discussion has shown anything, it shows that
the standards of review are anything but self-defining and self-applying. 112
Thus, viewing standards of review as boilerplate statements propagates
judicial confusion. 113
Furthermore, a lack of proper articulation of analyzing the standard
of review chosen increases the likelihood for judges to find loopholes for
employing judicial discretion. "1 Standards of review are complex and rely
heavily on circumstance. For there to be any real chance of clearing up the
confusion surrounding standards of review, the appellate court must engage
in the task of comprehensibly explaining when a standard of review
applies, why it is proper, and how it is to be applied throughout their
opinions when making a decision." 5
Standards of review often sound deceptively simple. The truth is
that all of the standards have "twists, in language or in practice" that
distinguish them from one another and from the similar situations in which
they can apply. 116 These twists reveal the complex process behind properly
applying standards of review and just how tangled that process has
become. 117 Nowhere has this point been made clearer then in reviewing
evidence where the boilerplate standard used by the courts no longer fits
at 255 (exposing problems in standard of review applications).
Id. (discussing issues with application of standard of review); see Stephen J. Choi & G.

108 Peters, supra note 25,
109

Mitu Gulati, Trading Votes for Reasoning: Covering in Judicial Opinions, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
735, 752 (2008) (acknowledging that judges have cut and paste string-cite boilerplates when

stating standard of review).
110Peters, supra note 25, at 256 (discussing how practitioners treat standards of review as
boilerplate).
III CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 24, § 1.01, at 1-4 (describing effect of courts using
standard of review as boilerplate).
112Peters, supra note 25, at 256-57 (elucidating difficulties in standards of review).
113 Id. at 257 (noting three standards without articulating which standard utilized by court).
114Id. (indicating that lack of definition allows for too much judge discretion).
115Id.
116 CHILDRESS

& DAVIS, supra note 24, § 1.01, at 1-4 (distinguishing standards of review

based on language or practice).
117 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 24, § 1.01, at 1-4.
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the practice." 8
III. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The appellate court states that evidentiary rulings made by the
lower court are within the discretion of the lower court and, as such, are
generally to be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 119 In fact, each Federal
Circuit Court and the Supreme Court has stated that evidentiary rulings are
typically reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 120 Abuse of discretion has

been the go-to standard of review for evidentiary rulings because our frame
of reference for the appropriate use of judicial discretion is "the trial forum,
where a solitary judge rules on the admission of evidence." 121 This
discretion suggests that, in evidentiary matters, among other areas of law,
the trial judge is not bound by any law to give a decision on an issue one
way versus another. 2 2 Evidence rules allow the trial court to exercise
discretion when the trial court is in a better position to make an evidentiary
ruling than an appellate court. 123 The trial court is allotted further
discretion regarding evidentiary questions. 124
The appellate court must review these decisions with great

deference because it better enables the trial judge to manage his or her

118 Peters, supra note 25, at 255-56.
119 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 24, § 11.02, at 11-5 (discussing appellate review of
admissibility decisions); see PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE § 6.13, at 87 (3d
ed. 2009) (same).
120 See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 n.1 (1997) (declaring standard of
review applicable to evidentiary rulings of district courts is abuse of discretion); United States v.
Diaz, 670 F.3d 332, 344 (1st Cir. 2012) (same); United States v. Pruett, 681 F.3d 232, 243 (5th
Cir. 2012) (same); United States v. Reese, 666 F.3d 1007, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012) (same); Wagner
v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 701 F.3d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 2012) (same); Chism v. CNH Am. LLC, 638
F.3d 637, 640 (8th Cir. 2011) (same); Brown v. Norris, 819 F.Supp.2d 1249, 1250 (11th Cir.
2011) (same); Witkowski v. Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 404 Fed.Appx. 674, 677 (3d Cir. 2010)
(same); United States v. Mercado, 573 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 2009) (same); United States v.
Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 325 (4th Cir. 2009) (same); Nolan v. Memphis City Schools, 589 F.3d
257, 264 (6th Cir. 2009) (same); Perkins v. Silver Mountain Sports Club & Spa, LLC, 557 F.3d
1141, 1146 (10th Cir. 2009) (same).
121 Jon R. Waltz, JudicialDiscretion in the Admission ofEvidence Under the FederalRules
of Evidence, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (1984) (explaining circumstances of judicial
discretion).
122 Id. at 1101 (indicating latitude at trial court level).
123 See RODGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW 613 (3d ed. 2011); see also Sprint/United

Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008) ("In deference to a district court's
familiarity with the details of the case and its greater experience in evidentiary matters, courts of
appeals afford broad discretion to a district court's evidentiary rulings.").
124 Mfendelsohn, 552 U.S. at 384.
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courtroom and produce decisions that have finality. 125 Having the appellate
court review evidentiary issues for an abuse of discretion enables the trial
court to make decisions with necessary leeway so that the ultimate goal of
"truth-determination" may be achieved. 126 Due to the great amount of
deference conferred upon trial courts in evidentiary matters, the trial court
is "granted a virtual shield" from reversal. 127 Generally, as long as a
decision falls within an acceptable range of possible decisions, the
appellate court will not overturn this 28decision, even if an error existed in
the application of discretionary rules. 1

However, the idea that not all evidentiary rulings should be
reviewed under the unitary standard of abuse of discretion is fundamental
and crucial to proper appellate review. 129 While the appellate court
generally applies a generic "abuse of discretion" rubber stamp to
evidentiary issues on review, the trial court's appraisal in forming a
decision can be "highly variable" and sometimes requires a different, more
applicable review approach. 30 A trial court's evidentiary decision as to an
admissibility determination, at times, can hinge on both legal and
discretionary questions. 3 ' When issues of interpretation and admissibility
are both present in an evidentiary ruling, it is necessary for the reviewing
court to distinguish whether a de novo standard, an abuse of discretion
standard, or both is proper. 132 Alternatively, if the appellate court finds that
an evidentiary issue within a rule did not confer any discretion to the trial
judge, the appellate court should give less deference and apply a de novo
standard of review. 133

125

PARK,

supra note 123, at 613 (explaining that appellate courts must review trial court

decisions with great deference).
126 Id. at 612 (explaining underlying policy's purpose when allowing trial judge some
deference).
127 Id. at 613 (describing trial courts as practically protected from reversal).
128 Id. at 614.; see also Waltz, supra note 121, at 1101.
129 David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1155, 1188
(1992) ("That not all evidentiary rulings should be reviewed according to the same standard is a
fundamental proposition.").
130 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 24, § 11.02, at 11-5 to -6.
131 Id. § 11.02, at 11-6; see, e.g., State v. Alvarez-Abrego, 225 P.3d 396, 361-62 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2010) (reviewing evidentiary rules interpretation de novo and evidence admissibility
interpretation for abuse of discretion); Citizens Fin. Grp. Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evans
City, 383 F.3d 110, 132-33 (3rd Cir. 2004) (reviewing Federal Rules of Evidence interpretation
plenary while reviewing decision to admit evidence for abuse); United States v. Alvarez, 358
F.3d 1194, 1214 (9th Cir. 2004) (determining hearsay rule construction de novo and decision to
admit non-hearsay for abuse of discretion).
132 Leonard, supra note 129, at 1188 ("[N]ot all evidentiary rulings should be reviewed
according to the same standard ....
").
133 PARK, supra note 123, at 614 (suggesting when appellate court should use de novo
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Although there is a great need for this type of in-depth reasoning
and analysis for determining a proper standard of review for an evidentiary
ruling, many courts still apply the "abuse of discretion" rubber stamp and
ignore the different standards that may be more appropriate. 134 In fact,
most courts are divided on which standard is the "appropriate" standard
when reviewing evidentiary rulings.135 While there may not be one correct
answer in finding an appropriate standard in these instances, the reviewing
court can help achieve some clarification "by explicitly pointing to the
issue to be decided." 13 6 This can be achieved by first determining whether
an evidentiary issue involves a trial judge's discretion, a factual decision, or
a question of law to help illuminate the proper standard. 137
When evidentiary issues are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, it
would be a mistake to assume that the application of that standard has the
same meaning in all cases. 38 Clarification on how the abuse of discretion
standard is applied to evidentiary matters is still needed. 3 9 Clarification is
also required on whether the abuse of discretion is applied or should be
applied to all evidentiary rulings; in particular, the evidence rule that has
created the most confusion for students, lawyers, professors, and judges for
centuries: hearsay. 140 As already noted and as will be explored more
below, courts reconsidering this question often create new tests or use de
novo review for issues of hearsay. Before considering how courts have
struggled with this issue, a brief introduction to hearsay is helpful for
context.
IV. THE HEARSAY RULE AND THE MULTIPLE LAYERS OF
ANALYSIS
"It is almost universally acknowledged that hearsay is less valuable
than other forms of information.' 14 '
Three primary reasons have
standard of review).
134 Leonard, supra note 129, at 1188.
135 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 103-

46 (Joseph P. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2006) (describing courts as divided when determining
which standard to use for evidentiary rulings).
136 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 24, § 11.02, at 11-8.
137 Id. § 11.02, at 11-8 (suggesting that clarification can be achieved by first defining type of
issue).

Leonard, supra note 129, at 1193.
See Leonard, supra note 129, at 1193 (urging for clarification of abuse of discretion
standard).
140 Id. at 1164 (stating de novo standard used when threshold rule is not satisfied).
138
139

141 CHRISTOPHER W. BEHAN, EVIDENCE AND THE ADVOCATE: A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH

TO LEARNING EVIDENCE 349 (2012) (suggesting that hearsay is less valuable than other
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traditionally been given for this. The reasons are that the statement was not
given under oath, the statement was not given in the presence of the factfinder so there is no opportunity to judge the demeanor of the person
making the statement, and there was no opportunity for cross-examination
to test such indicators like the perception, memory, narration, and sincerity
of the person who made the statement. 142
Figuring out if a statement is admissible over a hearsay objection
involves multiple layers of inquiry. 143 Without going into a full and
exhaustive description of the hearsay rule and its exceptions, which
typically takes 200 pages of an Evidence textbook or might require a 250page supplemental study aid just to understand that one article in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the inquiry can be broken down to two simple
steps: (1) is the statement hearsay by definition; and, (2) if so, does it meet
any exceptions? 144 First, the trial court must determine if a statement fits
the definition of hearsay. To do this, the court determines: (1) is it a
statement, (2) is it a statement other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at trial or hearing, and (3) is it being offered for the "truth of the
matter asserted?', 145 The trial court examines many potential legal and
factual issues with the help of these three questions. 146 For example, the
decision of whether the statement was made out of court would seem to be
a fairly straightforward fact inquiry, yet, it is not always clear if the
statement "being offered for the truth of the matter asserted" is a factual

decision 1 requiring deference by an appellate court or a purely legal
decision.

47

On the one hand, the trial court is in the best position to listen to
the witness explain what he or she thought the original statement meant
when he or she heard it. The trial court is also capable of reviewing all of
the circumstances that gave context to the statement, which calls for a clear

evidence).
142 FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's note (listing factors considered in evaluating

testimony of witnesses).

143 Id. (describing determination of whether statement is admissible as involving layers of
inquiry).
144 See, e.g., United States v. Dwyer, No. 05-3140, 2012 WL 2948189, at *3-5 (3d Cir. July

20, 2012) (applying process to review hearsay rulings); BEHAN, supra note 141, at 349-542
(discussing length of chapter entitled "Introduction to Hearsay"); CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, A
STUDENT'S GUIDE TO HEARSAY 250 (3d ed. 2007) (focusing on length of supplemental study aid

for hearsay).
145FED. R. EVID. 80 1(C) (defining hearsay).
146 Dwyer, 2012 WL 2948189, at *3-5.

147See, e.g., id. at *3-5 (applying process to review hearsay rulings); BEHAN, supra note
141, at 349-542 (discussing length of "Introduction to Hearsay" chapter); Fishman, supra note
144, at 250 (focusing on length of supplemental study aid for hearsay).
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error or abuse of discretion review. 148 Yet, on the other hand, the appellate
court will often consider whether a statement fits the definition of hearsay
as a legal question and will consequently perform a de novo standard of
1 149
review.
The rationale behind the de novo review is best explained in State
v. Saucier,50 whereby a Connecticut case embarked on the challenging
state-by-state and circuit-by-circuit survey into the various standards of
review used in the hearsay context:
[W]hether a challenged statement properly may be
classified as hearsay and whether a hearsay exception
properly is identified are legal questions demanding
plenary review. They require determinations about which
reasonable minds may not differ; there is no "judgment
call" by the trial court, and the trial court has no discretion
to admit hearsay in the absence of a provision providing
for its admissibility.' 5
In other words, many courts have decided that, because the
definition of hearsay is a legal definition, the courts simply have to make
legal determinations. However, as noted above and as will be seen in the
cases discussed below, this oversimplifies the various levels of inquiry
that
2
11
hearsay.
as
qualifies
even
statement
a
if
merely
out
figuring
go into
Second, if a statement does qualify as hearsay, the trial court must
consider whether an exception applies to the hearsay statement. '3 These
legal rules contain legal definitions that seem to call for legal
determinations. 154 Yet most appellate courts recognize that there are
certain concepts in the hearsay exceptions that require deference because of
the call for the trial court's expertise, experience, and unique position to
perceive witness testimony. 155 Examples of these hearsay exceptions from
case law are detailed below, but one can simply look to the Federal Rules
of Evidence for commonsense examples that might call for fact-finding,
148

State v. Saucier, 926 A.2d 633, 641-42 (Conn. 2007).

149 See id. (distinguishing appellate courts from trial courts in determining whether statement
is hearsay).
150 Id.
151 Id. at 641 (explaining rationale of de novo review).
152 See Wagner v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 701 F.3d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 2012).
153 See discussion infra Part V.B.2.
154 See discussion infra Part V.B.2.
155 See generally discussion infra Part V.B.2. Even appellate courts that customarily perform
a de novo review for all hearsay rulings agree that trial courts require deference in some
situations. See discussion infra Part V.B.2.
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56
credibility determinations, and a trial judge's quick decision-making. 1
Rule 803(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires the judge to
decide whether a statement was related to "a startling event or condition"
and whether the declarant was under the stress and excitement caused by
the event or condition. 5 7 Rule 803(3) asks whether the statement
communicates the declarant's "then existing mental, emotional, or physical
condition" and oftentimes requires a decision on whether the statement was
one that shows "intent, plan, (or) motive.""'
Both of these exceptions
seem to require basic fact-finding and judgment calls that would
traditionally be left to a trial judge.
In addition, some hearsay exceptions specifically call for a
determination of credibility or "trustworthiness" such as Federal Rules of
Evidence 803(6), 803(8), and 807.1'9 It would be difficult to imagine how
an appellate court could say that it would be in a similar or better position
to make this determination of "trustworthiness" than the trial court. In
these situations,
deference should be owed to the decision of the court
160

below.

Therefore, if a trial court is determining whether a statement meets
the definition of hearsay or whether a statement meets an exception to
hearsay, the language of the rules does not provide any neat formula for
whether a trial court ruling on the ultimate admissibility of the statement
would involve purely factual determinations or purely legal
determinations. 161 Traditionally deference is owed to a trial court on
evidentiary rulings and the basic legal and factual inquiries that go into a
trial court's hearsay ruling. Additionally, the approaches of the various
courts regarding appellate review of hearsay rulings should be reviewed.
V. STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN HEARSAY RULINGS
Before attempting to illustrate how various jurisdictions approach
the standard of review in relation to hearsay, it must be emphasized that
many of the state and federal appellate court judges are not entirely sure
See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (3), (6) (7).
157 FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (explaining excited utterances).
158 FED. R. EVID. 803(3) ("A statement of declarant's then-existing state of mind . . . or
156

emotional, sensory, or physical condition .... ).
159 See FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(E), ("[N]either the source of information nor the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness."); FED. R. EVID. 803(8)
(discussing public records exception to hearsay); FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(1) ("[H]as equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.").
160 See generally discussion infra Part V.B.2.
161 See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 24, § 1.02, at 11-18.
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what standard is being used within their jurisdiction.162 This point has been
most recently and emphatically noted in two 2012 cases. 163 These cases
from the Sixth and Ninth Circuit, United States v. Clay and Wagner v.
County of Maricopa, respectively document a split
in the circuits and the
64
confusion and conflict in their own jurisdictions. 1
A. Confusion in the Sixth andNinth Circuits
At issue in Wagner was the question of whether a statement was
properly excluded under the state of mind exception found in Rule 803(3)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 165 Although the majority and dissenting
opinions disagreed on whether the exception was met, the judges agreed on

one thing: there was no clear rule on what standard of review applies to a
hearsay ruling. 166 In his dissent, Judge N. Randy Smith begins his
"Standard of Review" section by stating, "[t]his circuit's case law is not

entirely clear regarding whether we review de novo a district court's
decision that a statement is or is not hearsay."1 67 In response, Judge John
T. Noonan, writing for the majority, agreed and stated in the majority
opinion: "[a]s Judge Smith points out, it is not entirely clear whether

construction of a hearsay rule is a matter of discretion or a legal issue
subject to de novo review."' 6 8 The majority and dissenting opinions in
Wagner together cited eight different cases from the Ninth Circuit between
1994 and 2011 that use different standards of review for this issue.
162
163

See Wagner v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 701 F.3d 583, 587-89 (9th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Clay, 677 F.3d 753, 755 (6th Cir. 2012) (Kethledge, J., dissenting);

Wagner, 701 F.3d at 587-89.
164 Clay, 677 F.3d at 755 (Kethledge, J., dissenting) (discussing intra-circuit conflict);
Wagner, 701 F.3d at 592 (Smith, J., dissenting) (describing how majority and dissent disagree on
appropriate standard of review).
165 Wagner, 701 F.3d at 587 (pointing out central issue in case).
166 Id. (discussing lack of clarity in defining which type of abuse of discretion should be
used).
167 Id. at 591 (Smith, J., dissenting) (pointing out that de novo standard should be applied).
168 Id. at 587 (majority opinion).
169 Compare United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2011) (using abuse
of discretion standard for hearsay ruling), with United States v. Ortega, 203 F.3d 675, 682 (9th
Cir. 2000) (using de novo standard for hearsay ruling); compare United States v. Stinson, 647
F.3d 1196, 1210 (9th Cir. 2011) ("We review a district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion."), and United States v. Tran, 568 F.3d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying abuse of
discretion standard in determining whether statement is hearsay under Rule 801), with Mahone v.
Lehman, 347 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2003) ("We review the district court's construction of
the hearsay rule de novo .... " (quoting Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 778 (9th
Cir. 2002))); and United States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973, 978-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (reviewing
statements were hearsay and not admissible de novo without mentioning abused of discretion),
with United States v. Warren, 25 F.3d 890, 894-95 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that statements were
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Notably, the Ninth Circuit recognizes the uncertainty in this area, even
though it chose not to resolve this uncertainty for future cases.171
The Sixth Circuit recently declared a broader uncertainty among
the circuits regarding the various standards used by federal appellate courts
to review hearsay rulings. 171 Judge Kethledge, in his dissent that urged
appellate courts to use an abuse of discretion standard for all evidentiary
rulings, noted several cases from the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits, which explain that either a de novo or abuse of discretion standard
of review is used for hearsay rulings.172 Not only is it significant that a
federal appellate judge has pointed out that the circuits are in disagreement
on this, but throughout his note and accompanying string cite, he also
discloses that the Sixth and the Ninth Circuit have actually disagreed with
173
itself on the issue.
In the last two lines of the dissent, Judge Kethledge sums up the
major problem by asserting the fact that there is no consensus on the proper
standard of review: "[b]ut again the relevant point is that we have one panel
after another disagreeing with each other as to which of these tests controls.
The practical result should be intolerable. In our circuit even the most

admissible without mentioning abuse of discretion). All the cases listed above were cited in the
dissenting opinion in Wagner. Wagner, 701 F.3d at 591.
170 See, e.g., United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1210 (9th Cir. 2011) (reviewing trial
court ruling for abuse of discretion); Mahone v. Lehman, 347 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2003)
(reviewing trial court's construction of the hearsay de novo); United States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d
973, 978-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (reviewing statements were hearsay and not admissible de novo
without mentioning abused of discretion).
171 United States v. Clay, 677 F.3d 753, 755 (6th Cir. 2012) (Kethledge, J., dissenting)
(highlighting Sixth Circuit's note of broader uncertainty among circuits regarding hearsay ruling
standards).
172 Id. at 755-56 ("So perhaps eventually the Supreme Court will remind us again that 'abuse
of discretion is the proper standard of review of a district court's evidentiary rulings."' (citing
U.S. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997))). Compare United States v. Tatum, 462
F.App'x 602, 605-06 (6th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original) ("[W]e review de novo the court's
ultimate legal conclusion that the statements may be received as non-hearsay"), and United States
v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 285 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying de novo review to the question whether
evidence is hearsay), and Mahone v. Lehman, 347 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted) (applying de novo review to "'construction of the hearsay rule"'), with United States v.
Brown, 669 F.3d 10, 22 (1st Cir. 2012) (reviewing admission of purported hearsay for abuse of
discretion), and United States v. Tran, 568 F.3d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 2009) (reviewing decision
for abuse of discretion that statement is admissible hearsay) and United States v. Lopez Garcia,
No. 98 2252, 1999 WL 707783, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1999) (applying abuse-of-discretion
review to decision whether evidence is hearsay), and Trepel v. Roadway Express, Inc., 194 F.3d
708, 716-17 (6th Cir. 1999) (rejecting de novo review of district court's decision whether
evidence is inadmissible hearsay). Clay, 677 F.3d at 755 (Kethledge, J., dissenting) (citing listed
cases).
173 Clay, 677 F.3d at 754 (Kethledge, J., dissenting) (nothing disagreement between Sixth
and Ninth Circuit).
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conscientious district-court
judge cannot tell what the law is on this
174
issue.,'
important
B. Six Different Standardsand Tests in Various Jurisdictions
When reviewing the federal and state courts to figure out what
standard is used by appellate courts to review hearsay rulings made by trial
courts, confusion is the norm. As noted earlier, often the appellate courts
in the circuit or at the state level will disagree with earlier holdings and
have trouble determining the standard of review for their own
jurisdictions. 175 In addition, many jurisdictions self-identify as having one
standard of review but will break from that particular standard when it is
convenient for a particular case. 176 Consequently, accurately identifying all
of the various standards is challenging, even when judges and their clerks
attempt to take a survey of the federal and state courts. 1 7 7 At least six
different standards of review are used by various courts when analyzing
trial court rulings on hearsay: (1) traditional abuse of discretion used for all
evidentiary rulings; (2) de novo review as general rule, but breaking from
that rule for review of fact and credibility determinations; (3) two-part test
where court first reviews whether statement fits definition of hearsay de
novo and second reviews for abuse of discretion whether statement falls
within hearsay exception; (4) two-part test where court reviews first for
clear error the factual findings underpinning a trial court's hearsay ruling
and second reviews de novo the ultimate determination to admit the
evidence; (5) three-part test that uses a mix of de novo, clear error, and
abuse of discretion; and (6) no bright line rule at all that uses a standard of
review depending on the issues raised by the particular hearsay
objection. 171
1. Abuse of Discretion
As detailed in Part III, trial courts are traditionally afforded great
deference in all evidentiary rulings primarily because the trial court is in
the best position to hear and assess the witnesses' testimony in the context

174

Id. at 756 (summarizing major problem with circuit split).

175 See discussion supra Part I (highlighting complexities of applying appropriate standard of

review and lack of consistency).
176 See discussion infra Part V.B.2 (analyzing hearsay rulings de novo and factual or
credibility determinations by clear error or abuse).
177 See discussion infra Part V.B (describing different standards of review).
178 See discussion supra Part III (detailing standards of review).
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of the entire trial, and the trial judge has customarily been given leeway to
79
manage his or her courtroom and put forth decisions that have finality. 1
Most jurisdictions use the abuse of discretion standard of review for
hearsay rulings as well. 8 ° In explaining the rationale behind this level of
deference, the Tenth Circuit explained that, "Given the fact- and casespecific nature of hearsay determinations, 'our review of those decisions is
especially deferential. ,,,181
In spite of the fact that courts using this standard emphasize the
"fact- and case-specific" determinations, a few of the appellate courts

179

See discussion supra Part II (outlining standards of review and problems with defining

and applying them).
180 See United States v. Brown, 669 F.3d 10, 22 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding hearsay rulings
reviewed for abuse of discretion); United States v. Blechman, 657 F.3d 1052, 1063 (10th Cir.
2011) (same); United States v. Nicksion, 628 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 2010) (same); United States
v. Wright, 540 F.3d 833, 843 (8th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151,
155 (2d Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1359 (11th Cir. 2006) (same),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1182 (2007); United States v. Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 121 22 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (same); United States v. Ware, 29 Fed.Appx. 118, 119 (4th Cir. 2002) (same); United
States v. Aguilar-Tamayo, 300 F.3d 562, 564 (5th Cir. 2002) (same); Kolmes v. World Fibers
Corp., 107 F.3d 1534, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (same); Queen v. Belcher, 888 So.2d 472, 477 (Ala.
2003) (same); Wyatt v. State, 981 P.2d 109, 112 (Alaska 1999) (same); State v. Tucker, 68 P.3d
110, 118 (Ariz. 2003) (same); Millerv. State, 362 S.W.3d 264, 282 (Ark. 2010) (same); People v.
Zambrano, 163 P.3d 4, 48-49 (Cal. 2007) (same); In re Water Rights of Central Colorado Water
Conservancy Dist. v. Greeley, 147 P.3d 9, 17 n.7 (Colo. 2006) (same); Pressey v. State, 25 A.3d
756, 758 (Del. 2011) (same); Butler v. State, 721 S.E.2d 889, 892 (Ga. 2012) (same); State v.
Chacon, 186 P.3d 670, 672 (Idaho 2008) (same); People v. Caffey, 792 N.E.2d 1163, 1188 (Ill.
2001) (same); Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 473 (Ind. 2001) (same); State v. Miller, 163
P.3d 267, 288 (Kan. 2007) (same); Martin v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 374, 382 (Ky. 2005)
(same); Menard v. Holland, 919 So.2d 810, 815 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (same); State v. Guyette, 36
A.3d 916, 919 (Me. 2012) (same); Commonwealth v. Lampron, 806 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Mass. 2004)
(same); People v. Stamper, 742 N.W.2d 607, 609 (Mich. 2007) (same); State v. Burrell, 772
N.W.2d 459, 469 (Minn. 2009) (same); White v. State, 48 So.3d 454, 456 (Miss. 2010) (same);
State v. Taylor, 298 S.W.3d 482, 492 (Mo. 2009) (same); State v. Cameron, 106 P.3d 1189, 1197
(Mont. 2005) (same); Harkins V. State, 143 P.3d 706, 709 (Nev. 2006) (same); State v. Beltran,
904 A.2d 709, 715 (N.H. 2006) (same); State v.P.S., 997 A.2d 163, 174 (N.J. 2010) (same); State
v. Lopez, 258 P.3d 458, 461 (N.M. 2011) (same); People v. Gantt, 848 N.Y. S.2d 156, 160 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2007) (same); State v. Brigman, 632 S.E.2d 498, 504 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (same);
State v. Stridiron, 777 N.W.2d 892, 901 (N.D. 2010) (same); Beard v. Meridia Huron Hosp., 834
N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ohio 2005) (same); In re J.D.H., 130 P.3d 245, 247 (Okla. 2006) (same);
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 902 A.2d 430, 456-57 (Pa. 2006) (same); State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d
140, 151 (R.I. 2009) (same); State v. Byers, 710 S.E.2d 55, 57-58 (S.C. 2011) (same); State v.
Huber, 789 N.W.2d 283, 298 (S.D. 2010) (same); State v. Flood, 219 S.W.3d 307, 313 (Tenn.
2007) (same); Nadal v. State, 348 S.W.3d 304, 318 (Tex. App. 2011) (same); State v. Haner, Sr.,
928 A.2d 518, 524 (Vt. 2007) (same); Lynch v. Coin, 617 S.E.2d 399, 403 (Va. Ct. App. 2005)
(same); State v. Magers, 189 P.3d 126, 133 (Wash. 2008) (same); State v. Larry M., 599 S.E.2d
781, 786 (W.Va. 2004) (same); State v. Manuel, 697 N.W.2d 811, 818 (Wis. 2005) (same);
Boykin v. State, 105 P.3d 481, 482-83 (Wyo. 2005) (same).
181Blechman, 657 F.3d at 1063 (quoting United States v. Chavez, 229 F.3d 946, 950 (10th
Cir. 2000)) (citing United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142 (10th Cir. 2005)).
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ordinarily reviewing admission of hearsay evidence for abuse of discretion
find that there may be some questions of law within the hearsay rule, which
permits the court to review those questions de novo. For example, the
Supreme Court of Kansas explained that anything involving statutory
interpretation would require a de novo review. 18 2 In addition, because
evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and the
traditional definition as "[a]n abuse of discretion will be found only where
the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court," the
Illinois Supreme Court also describes an exception to this general rule of
deference. 83 The court explains that evidentiary rulings will be reviewed
de novo when "a trial court's
exercise of discretion has been frustrated by
184
an erroneous rule of law.,i
Some jurisdictions define abuse of discretion as having a multilayered approach that analyzes fact and law issues separately and with
different standards of review. For example, the Missouri Supreme Court
explained:
A trial court can abuse its discretion through the inaccurate
resolution of factual issues or through the application of
incorrect legal principles. Where the facts are at issue,
appellate courts extend substantial deference to trial court
decisions. However, when the issue is primarily legal, no
deference is warranted and appellate courts engage in de
185
novo review.
The Second Circuit appears to do the best job of explaining the
complicated and confusing interplay between the abuse of discretion and de
novo standards of review:
[A] district court necessarily "abuses its discretion" if it
makes an error of law. In this way, review for "abuse of
discretion" and de novo review are not entirely distinct
concepts, but rather, review for abuse of discretion

182

State v. Robinson, 270 P.3d 1183, 1198 (Kan. 2012) (citations omitted) ("Ordinarily, we

review the admission of hearsay evidence for an abuse of discretion. However, the issue of
whether the trial court complied with specific statutory requirements for admitting evidence
requires statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.").
183 Caffey, 792 N.E.2d at 1188 (discussing exclusion of hearsay statements).
184 Id. (citing People v. Williams, 721 N.E.2d 539, 542 (Ill. 1999)); People v. Aguilar, 637
N.E.2d 1221 (Ill. 1994).
185 Taylor, 298 S.W.3d at 492 (explaining evidentiary standard of review).
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incorporates, among other8 6things, de novo review of
district court rulings of law.
Therefore, the abuse of discretion standard of review spans the
spectrum of deference. At one extreme, it is a standard so deferential that it
has been described as a "virtual shield" or "rubber stamp" of trial court
rulings; but at the other end of the spectrum, when it is defined to
necessarily include de novo review of legal conclusions, it is a standard that
owes no deference to a trial court ruling. 8 7 As explored in detail in the
next five subsections, despite this potential definition or rule of abuse of
discretion as one that sweeps sufficiently far to encompass de novo review
of legal rulings, many jurisdictions create special standards of review for
hearsay determinations that further emphasize the many layers of inquiry in
a typical hearsay ruling.'8 8
2. De Novo Review
Several state jurisdictions call for a de novo review of hearsay
rulings as its self-defined standard of review. 1" These jurisdictions
emphasize that hearsay determinations primarily involve statutory
interpretation. 190 They further explain that a trial court does not have
discretion to interpret the rules of hearsay. 191 The Supreme Court in
Connecticut, which claims to reject a de novo standard of review, describes
the rationale for using a de novo review for hearsay rulings as one that
reviews the legal questions with plenary review to ensure the trial court's
discretion of hearsay and hearsay exceptions was soundly determined. 192
Of the jurisdictions that adopt the de novo standard of review, most
recognize exceptions to that level of deference and apply a clear error or
abuse of discretion review when the trial court engages in fact-finding or
186

United States v. Hasan, 586 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original) (quoting

United States v. Legros, 529 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2008)) ("The abuse-of-discretion standard
incorporates de novo review of questions of law (including interpretation of the Guidelines) and
clear-error review of questions of fact.").
187 See discussion supra Part III (elaborating on abuse of discretion standard).
188 See discussion infra Part V.B.2-6 (explaining various standards of review for hearsay
determinations).
189 See discussion infra Part V.B.6 (explaining de novo standard).
190 See discussion infra Part V.B.6 (noting importance of statutory interpretation).
191 See discussion infra Part V.B.6 (describing de novo standard).
192 State v. Saucier, 926 A.2d 633, 641 (Conn. 2007) (discussing plenary review); see
discussion infra Part V.B.6 (describing inconsistencies and confusing legal reasoning in Saucier).
Saucier explains its rationale for de novo review but ultimately applies an abuse of discretion
review. See Saucier,936 A.2d at 641; see also discussion infra Part V.B.6.
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credibility determinations required for ruling. For example, appellate
courts that generally use de novo review for hearsay will defer to the trial
court's rulings on many different matters. 193 These matters include whether
an excited utterance has been made, whether a conspiracy existed, whether
a statement was offered for something other than the truth of the matter
asserted, and whether "trustworthiness" determinations were found in
several hearsay exceptions. 194
a. De Novo Review with No Exception

Maryland

Courts in Maryland ordinarily review evidence rulings with an
abuse of discretion standard. 195 However, in 2005 the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that review of "admissibility of evidence which is hearsay is
different.', 196 The court stated that the de novo standard of review applies
to both questions traditionally faced by a trial court when ruling on hearsay
objections: (1) whether the 97statement is hearsay and (2) whether an
exception to hearsay applies. 1
By reversing a trial court's decision to admit a document and its
contents into evidence over a hearsay objection that had been upheld by the
intermediate court of appeals, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals broke
from the traditional standard of review used to review all evidentiary
rulings in the state. 198 This abuse of discretion standard was stated clearly
by the intermediate court in Bernadyn v. State 99 in its explanation of what
the court thought was the standard of review at the time.200
The
intermediate court cited three earlier cases from the Maryland Court of
Appeals that articulated the abuse of discretion standard, which had used
language as powerful as "plainly inadmissible," "may not be disturbed on

193 See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing how different appellate courts use de novo review);
Bernadyn v. State, 831 A.2d 532, 536-37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (allowing deference to trial
court unless abuse of discretion occurs), rev 'd, 887 A.2d 602 (Md. 2005).
194 See infra Part V.B.2; Bernadyn, 831 A.2d at 536-37.
195 See Hopkins v. State, 721 A.2d 231, 237 (Md. 1998) (reviewing ruling on evidence with
abuse of discretion).
196 Bernadyn v. State, 887 A.2d 602, 606 (Md. 2005) (stating hearsay admissibility requires
different kind of review).
197 Id. at 606 ("Whether evidence is hearsay is an issue of law reviewed de novo.").
"Hearsay . . . must be excluded . . . unless it falls within an exception ... or is 'permitted by
applicable constitutional provisions or statutes.' Thus, a circuit court has no discretion to admit
hearsay in the absence of a provision providing for its admissibility." Id.
198 See Bernadyn, 831 A.2d at 541 (reversing hearsay ruling under abuse of discretion
standard of review).
199 887 A.2d 602 (Md. 2005).
200 Id. at 606 (stating abuse of discretion standard).
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20
appeal," and "great deference.",
With the de novo standard in place, the court first examined
whether a particular piece of evidence, a medical bill discovered at the
crime scene, was hearsay. 20 2 The court held that this document constituted

hearsay because it was introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted;
specifically, that defendant resided at the address on the bill. 203 After
determining that the document was hearsay, the court turned to 20whether
the
4
document was admissible under the business records exception.
In giving no deference to the trial court's ruling on either of these
questions, the court abandoned the traditional abuse of discretion standard

for reviewing the admissibility of evidence over hearsay objections and
separated its court system from the many courts that use a two-step review
of hearsay rulings. 20 5 As discussed in Part V.B.3, although some courts

consider the first question of whether a statement is hearsay to be a legal
issue, these courts recognize that many fact-specific and credibility
questions may arise when deciding whether an exception applies.20 6 For
example, the business records exception at issue in Bernadyn raises many
questions that might reasonably be considered fact-specific and that might
depend on the credibility of a witness. As the court correctly noted, to

meet this exception, the State would have been required to show that the
document was:

made at or near the time of any event; that it was made by
a person with knowledge, or from information transmitted
by a person with knowledge; that the bill was made and
201 Bernadyn, 831 A.2d at 536-37 (citing Hopkins v. State, 21 A.2d 231, 237 (Md. 1998))
("[W]e extend to the trial court great deference in determining the admissibility of evidence and
will reverse only if the court abused its discretion."), rev'd, 887 A.2d 602 (Md. 2005). Reversal
occurs "ifthe evidence is plainly inadmissible under a specific rule or principle of law or there is
a clear showing of an abuse of discretion." Id. at 536 (citing Merzbacher v. State, 697 A.2d 432,
439 (Md. 1997)). The court also reviewed Conyers v. State, 729 A.2d 910 (Md. 1999), and found
that the trial court's determination regarding the admissibility of evidence "may not be disturbed
on appeal unless there has been an abuse of that discretion." Id. The court grants deference to the
trial court for "determining the admissibility of evidence and will reverse only if the court abused
its discretion." Id. at 537 (citing Hopkins v. State, 21 A.2d 231, 237 (Md. 1998)).
202 Bernadyn, 887 A.2d at 607-12 (determining whether medical bill was inadmisible
hearsay).
203 Id. (concluding evidence constituted hearsay).
204 Id. at 612-15. The court held that business record exception under Maryland rule 5803(b)(6) derived from FRE 803(b)(6), did not apply. Id. No custodian was called to verify that
the document met the specific requirements under the rule and that the document was not selfauthenticating to meet exception to hearsay. Id. at 615.
205 See discussion infra in Part V.B.3 (recognizing issues arising out of hearsay exception).
206 See discussion infra in Part V.B.3 (recognizing that questions can arise when determining
whether hearsay exceptions apply).
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kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity;
or that it was the regular practice of [the business] to make
and keep that record.2

7

At trial, the State did not even call a witness to testify to any of
these matters because the trial court held that the bill was not hearsay, so
there was no need to decide whether an exception applied.2 °8
However, the questions that are typically raised in meeting the
business records exception and that are listed by the court provide a good
example of why so many courts use an abuse of discretion or clear error
standard when reviewing whether an exception has been met, even when
they review the existence of hearsay de novo.2 °9 Specifically, a trial court
might be in a better position to make these determinations because the
court asks questions like: was the document made at the time of a particular
event?, was it made by a person with knowledge?, was it made in the
course of regularly conducted business activity?, and was it the regular
practice of the business to make and keep those records? 2 0 The court's
determination of the answers to these questions could very well depend on
the credibility of the particular witness who is the proffered custodian of
the document. 2 1'
Regardless of how other jurisdictions view the matter, Maryland
courts have continued to use the de novo standard of review in evaluating
the business records exception.212 In addition to using the de novo standard
to evaluate a business records exception, the Maryland courts have had the
opportunity to use the de novo standard to review the question of whether a
statement was offered for the truth of the matter, thus, constituting
hearsay.213 Maryland courts have also used the de novo standard to review
207
208
209

Bernadyn, 887 A.2d at 613.
Id. at 611 (addressing issue of whether medical bill with address on it is hearsay).
Id. at 615 (stating proponent of evidence must establish proper foundation as to its

reliability); FED. R. EVID. 803(b)(6) (defining hearsay rule relating to business records).
210 Bernadyn, 887 A.2d at 615 (requiring evidence must to be reliable); FED. R. EVID.
803(b)(6) (defining hearsay rule for business records).
211 Bernadyn, 887 A.2d at 614 (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(6) ("[The trial court] still must
determine the truth of the information provided because rule 803(6) also requires that the
information be 'transmitted by, a person with knowledge. "').
212 Hall v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 919 A.2d 1177, 1193 (Md. 2007) (holding "the
trial court erred, as a matter of law, by excluding two entries"). The trial court excluded medical
records by deciding that the documents were hearsay. Id. "The entries met the requirements of
the business records exception to the hearsay rule .... Id.
213 Handy v. State, 30 A.3d 197, 208 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (reviewing de novo whether
hearsay evidence is issue of law), cert. denied, 37 A.3d 318 (Md. 2012). In Handy, the court held
that the statements were not hearsay because they were offered for purposes of assessing a
witness's credibility. Id.
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whether an exception, other than business records exception, applies to a
hearsay statement.214
b. De Novo Review but Recognizing Fact-FindingDeference
for "Truth ofMatter Asserted" and Existence of
ConspiracyDeterminations Iowa
Similar to other jurisdictions that use a de novo standard to review
hearsay rulings, Iowa courts typically review rulings on the admission of
evidence for an abuse of discretion. 215 However, since 1998, the Iowa
Supreme Court has instructed that "[during] the course of hearsay rulings,
our review is for correction of errors at law., 216 The standard of review
was further clarified in 2003 to make it clear that the de novo standard
applies to both the question of whether a particular statement constitutes
hearsay and the question of whether a hearsay statement is admissible
21 The Iowa Supreme Court states another
under an enumerated exception. 217
justification for the de novo standard by emphasizing that review should be

for corrections of errors at law because admission of hearsay evidence is
presumed to be prejudicial.218

214

Id. at 208 (reviewing hearsay evidence with de novo standard of review); Dulyx v. State,

40 A.3d 416, 429 (Md. 2012) (reviewing admission of former testimony using de novo standard
of review). If a witness's out-of-court statements are offered for purposes of impeachment or
rehabilitation of the witness's credibility, then they are not hearsay. Handy, 30 A.3d at 208. The
court in Dulyx reversed because Rule 5 804(b)(1) allows the defendant to have the opportunity to
develop testimony during suppression hearings. Dulyx, 40 A.3d at 429. The opportunity to
cross-examine is also found in FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1)(B) because prior testimony must be "now
offered against a party who had or, in a civil case, whose predecessor in interest had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination." See FED.
R. EVID. 804(b)(1)(B).
215 State v. Jordan, 663 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Iowa 2003) (citing State v. Ross, 573 N.W.2d 906,
910 (Iowa 1998)) ("Except in cases of hearsay rulings, trial courts have discretion to admit
evidence under a rule of evidence.").
216 Ross, 573 N.W.2d at 910 (reviewing district court's determination regarding jury
instructions).
217 State v. Dullard, 668 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Iowa 2003) (citing United States v. McGlory, 968
F.2d 309, 332 (3d Cir. 1992)) ("[T]he question whether a particular statement constitutes hearsay
presents a legal issue."); see also State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 18 (Iowa 2006) (citing Dullard,
668 N.W.2d at 589)) ("Subject to the requirement of relevance, the district court has no discretion
to deny the admission of hearsay if it falls within an exception, or to admit it in the absence of a
provision providing for admission."). "[A] district court has no discretion to deny the admission
of hearsay if the statement falls within an enumerated exception, subject, of course, to the rule of
relevance under rule 5.403, and has no discretion to admit hearsay in the absence of a provision
providing for it." Dullard,668 N.W.2d at 589.
218 See, e.g., Newell, 710 N.W.2d at 23-24 (determining whether evidence is hearsay or
prejudicial using de novo standard of review); State v. Long, 628 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Iowa 2001)
(presuming prejudice to non-offering party unless contrary is established); McElroy v. State, 637
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Despite the often-articulated rule calling for de novo review and
corrections of errors of law, the Iowa Supreme Court has deviated from this
standard of review or at least alluded to potential fact questions more
appropriate for a trial court in three different contexts. In one context, the
Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the factual question of whether testimony is
being offered for something other than the truth of the matter asserted and
thus is not hearsay.2 19 In another context, the question was whether the

existence of a conspiracy for purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 220 In the third context, in 2004, the court inexplicably
broke from the rule, cited to a 1996 intermediate appellate court22 decision,
and invoked an abuse of discretion standard for a hearsay ruling. 1
In McElroy v. State,222 the Iowa Supreme Court examined whether
the district court improperly excluded evidence at trial of prior out-of-court
statements concerning the behavior of a graduate student's supervising
professor who allegedly sexually harassed her. 223 The issue before the

court was whether the statements were offered for the truth of the matter
asserted or admissible as non-hearsay to show the plaintiff s "state of mind
or knowledge [or] responsive conduct by the defendants." 224 Rather than
reviewing the statements and rule as a matter of law regarding whether the
statements were hearsay, the decision mentioned several fact-specific
examples for the district court to consider during a retrial and instructed the
district court to consider whether the excluded evidence had value
independent of the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.22 5 The

N.W.2d 488, 493 (Iowa 2001) (holding jury instruction was prejudicial to Appellate and
consequently improper); Ross, 573 N.W.2d at 910 (stating hearsay is presumed to be prejudicial
to non-offering party unless contrary is established).
219 McElroy, 637 N.W.2d at 501 (defining hearsay).
220 See State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564, 569 (Iowa 2000) (reviewing trial court's
determination of conspiracy under substantial-evidence test); see also Long, 628 N.W.2d at 447
("We review a district court's determination that a conspiracy existed [for purposes of Iowa Rule
of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E)] under the substantial-evidence test."). The language of IOWA R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(E) is identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence. See IOWA R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E)
(defining statement of coconspirator as made during conspiracy and in furtherance of conspiracy);
FED. R. EVID. 80 1(d)(2)(E) (same).
221 State v. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d 744, 753 (Iowa 2004) (citing State v. Forsyth, 547 N.W.2d
833, 839 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996)) ("Where a party challenges the district courts exclusion of
evidence as hearsay, appellate review is for an abuse of discretion.").
222 637 N.W.2d 488 (Iowa 2001).
223 Id. at 501 (determining whether lower court misapplied hearsay rule).
2I4 Id. (discussing issue of whether district court improperly excluded evidence of proper
out-of-court statements).
225 Id. at 501-02 (citing Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155, 1163 (8th Cir. 1999)) ("For
example, the statement may be offered simply to demonstrate it was made, to explain subsequent
actions by the listener, or to show notice to or knowledge of the listener."); State v. Mitchell, 450
N.W.2d 828, 832 (Iowa 1990) (discussing responsive conduct); Roberts v. Newville, 554 N.W.2d
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decision also instructed that "[a]lthough a statement may be purportedly
offered for a non-hearsay purpose, the district court must still determine if
the party's true purpose in offering the evidence was in fact to prove the
statement's truth., 226 The decision gave specific cases and scenarios in
sexual harassment actions for the district court to consider in making this
determination.227
Although never specifically mentioning that the district court's
hearsay rulings would be reviewed for abuse of discretion or clear error, the
court did not rule as a matter of law. Everything in its opinion related to
this hearsay question references the fact finding and credibility
determinations typically handled by the trial court. Specifically, the
decision recognized that certain out-of-court statements are legally
admissible when certain facts are present, but left it to the trial court to
answer such factual questions as: (1) do these statements help prove notice
to the defendant?; (2) do they help prove the defendant responded to
allegations?;
and (3) do the internal documents help explain the employer's
228
conduct?
The Iowa Supreme Court has more clearly stated that preliminary
fact-finding is necessary in the context of whether a conspiracy existed for
purposes of Rule 801(d)(2). 229 To explain why appellate courts should
defer to the trial court in making this determination, the court cites to New
York v. Hendrickson Bros.,23 ° a federal appellate court decision.231
Under [Federal] Rule 801(d)(2)(E), an out-of-court
statement is not hearsay with respect to a given party if it
was made by a co-conspirator of that party in furtherance

298, 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (characterizing all examples)); 7 JAMES A. ADAMS & JOSEPH P.
WEEG, IOWA PRACTICE SERIES: EVIDENCE § 801.4, at 578-83 (Thompson-West 2005) (same);
JOHN W. STRONG ET. AL., AI/CCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 249, at 102 (West Group, 5th ed. 1999)
(same).
226 McElroy, 637 N.W.2d at 501 (emphasis added) (citing State
v. Hollins, 397 N.W.2d 701,
705 (Iowa 1987)); State v. Martin, 587 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998); ADAMS & WEEG,
supra note 225, at 569.
227 McElroy, 637 N.W.2d at 502 (citing Baker v.McDonald's Corp., 686 F.Supp. 1474, 1478
n.10 (S.D.Fla.1987)) ("Generally, out-of-court statements may be relevant in sexual harassment

actions to prove either notice or responsive conduct on behalf of the defendant."). "Furthermore,
internal documents relied upon by an employer in making employment decisions in a
discrimination case are generally not hearsay because they can be relevant to explain the
employer's conduct." Id. (citing Wolff v. Brown, 128 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir.1997)).
228 See id. at 501-02 (instructing ways that statements could be introduced as non-hearsay).
229 State v. Long, 628 N.W.2d 440, 446-47 (Iowa 2001) (stating hearsay exception for coconspirator).
230 840 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1988).
231 Long, 628 N.W.2d at 446-47 (citing Hendrickson Bros., 840 F.2d at 1073).
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of the conspiracy. In order to admit such a statement, the
trial court is required to find, as preliminary facts under
Fed. R. Evid. 104(a), that a preponderance of the evidence
supports the conclusions that there was a conspiracy, that
both the declarant and the party against whom the
statement is offered were members of it, and that the
statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy ....
The trial court's determinations of these preliminary facts
may not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. 232

Noting these factual determinations inherent in hearsay rulings are
significant. These factual determinations show that, even in a jurisdiction
that reviews hearsay rulings as a matter of law, there are some obvious
times when the trial court engages in fact finding to make the rulings.233 In
these instances, it is not the place of an appellate court to substitute its
judgment in those situations.234

The Iowa Supreme Court again made a break from reviewing
hearsay rulings as a matter of law in 2004 .235 This was the only time that
the Iowa Supreme Court made a blanket statement holding that hearsay
would be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, despite the many cases,
before and after, that discuss the question as a legal one.236 This particular
standard of review was also made once afterwards by an intermediate court
of appeals in 2005 .237 However, despite these two cases in 2004 and 2005
that inexplicably used the abuse of discretion standard, the Iowa courts
seem to be clear that, other than some specific settings, like the factual
finding of a conspiracy, review of hearsay rulings should be de novo. 2381

232 HendricksonBros., 840 F.2d at 1073.
233 See Walker v. State, 668 A.2d 990, 999 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (reviewing unreserved
issue from trial court).
234 Long, 628 N.W.2d at 447 ("We review the admission of hearsay for errors of law ....
[h]owever, we give deference to the district court's factual findings .... ).
235 State v. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d 744, 753 (Iowa 2004) (C[A]pellate review is for an abuse of
discretion.").
236

Id.

237 State v. Harper, 697 N.W.2d 127, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (Table) ("The Court's
decision is referenced in a 'Decisions Without Published Opinions' table in the North Western
Reporter.")
238 See State v. Harper, 770 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Iowa 2009) (citing State v. Newell, 710
N.W.2d 6, 18 (Iowa 2006)) ("We review hearsay claims for errors at law.").
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c. De Novo Review but Recognizing Fact Finding in "Excited
Utterance" Exception D.C. Circuit

The District of Columbia follows the majority of jurisdictions in
recognizing that the trial court "is entrusted with broad discretion to
determine the substance, form, and quantum of evidence which is to be
presented to a jury. 2' 19 Most evidentiary rulings are only reviewed for
abuse of discretion.2 40 However, whether a particular statement is
inadmissible as hearsay or admissible under an exception to the hearsay
rule is a question of law that District of Columbia appellate courts reviewde
241
novo.
In joining the many other jurisdictions that seem to contradict
themselves-or at least confuse themselves-the appellate courts in the
District of Columbia recognized on several occasions that underlying
factual findings may be reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard when
the court evaluates a trial court's admission of hearsay statements as
excited utterances.242 The courts then go one step further and state that
once a statement has been found to qualify under the excited utterance
exception, "the decision whether to admit or exclude the proffered
statement . . . is reviewed for abuse of discretion., 243 The interplay
between these three standards was summarized by the District of Columbia
Circuit Court in 2011 when the court explained that to evaluate the
admissibility of evidence under the excited utterance exception, "our
review focuses on the different aspects of the trial court's decision-factfinding, application of the law, and exercise of discretion., 244 The court
stresses that determining whether a statement is accepted under a hearsay

239 Johnson v. United States, 452 A.2d 959, 960 (D.C. 1982) (explaining that trial judge has
wide latitude when determining if evidentiary rules are violated).
240 Perrittv. United States, 640 A.2d 702, 705 (D.C. 1994) ("[C]ourt's scope of review is
limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion.").
241 See Dutch v. United States, 997 A.2d 685, 689 (D.C. 2010) (emphasis in original) (citing
Brown v. United States, 840 A.2d 82, 88 (D.C. 2004)) ("[T]he determination of whether a
statement falls under [the excited utterance] exception ... is a legal conclusion, which we review
de novo."); see also Melendez v. United States, 26 A.3d 234, 245 (D.C. 2011) (holding statement
by child witness of murder was excited utterance under hearsay exception).
242 Odemns v. United States, 901 A.2d 770, 776 (D.C. 2006). ("[T]he underlying factual
findings are reviewed under the 'clearly erroneous' standard .... "); see also Graure v. United
States, 18 A.3d 743, 755 (D.C. 2011) (recognizing excited utterance as well-known exception to
hearsay), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 360 (2011); Afelendez, 26 A.3d at 245 (interpreting excited
utterance exception to hearsay rule).
243 Aelendez, 26 A.3d at 245 (quoting Odemns, 901 A.2d at 776).
244 Brown v. United States, 27 A.3d 127, 130 (D.C. 2011) (summarizing interplay between
three standards of review), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 274 (U.S. 2012).
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exception is dependent on the specific facts in each case. 2 4 5

Fact questions that must be answered by the trial court
include whether there is: (1) the presence of a serious
occurrence which causes a state of nervous excitement or
physical shock in the declarant, (2) a declaration made
within a reasonably short period of time after the

occurrence so as to assure that the declarant has not
reflected upon his statement or premeditated or constructed

it, and (3) the presence of circumstances, which in their
totality suggest spontaneity and sincerity of the remark.246
These questions call for fact-finding determinations into such
matters as what did the witness observe and is there evidence or testimony

that it caused excitement or stress?; how much time transpired between
occurrence and the reaction?; and do the totality of circumstances suggest
"sincerity," a clear credibility determination? 247 Therefore, the excited
utterance rule has been noted as another example of an exception to
hearsay where a court articulates particular underlying fact questions that
must be decided, even in a jurisdiction that typically calls for a de novo
review of hearsay.248
d.De Novo Review Unless Trial CourtMakes Determinations
of "Trustworthiness" Hawaii
In Hawaii, courts mention on several occasions that there can only
be one correct result and, therefore, the application of the hearsay rule is
reviewed under the right/wrong standard.249 This right/wrong standard is

245

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. United States, 666 A.2d 1216, 1222 (D.C.

1995)).

Id. at 131 (emphasis added) (quoting Odemns, 901 A.2d at 776).
See Odemns, 901 A.2d at 778 (analyzing elements of excitted utterance).
248 Dutch v. United States, 997 A.2d 685, 689 (D.C. 2010) (quoting Brown v. United
246
247

States, 840 A.2d 82, 88 (D.C. 2004)) ("'[T]he determination of whether a statement falls under
[the excited utterance] exception.., is a legal conclusion, which we review de novo. ").
249 See State v. Fitzwater, 227 P.3d 520, 528 (Haw. 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting State v.
Machado, 127 P.3d 941, 946 (2006)) ("Where admissibility of evidence is determined by
application of the hearsay rule, there can only be one correct result, and the appropriate standard
for appellate review is the right/wrong standard."); see also State v. Yamada, 57 P.3d 467, 475
(Haw. 2002) ("We review the admissibility of evidence pursuant to HRE Rule 803 under the
right/wrong standard, because jt]he requirements of the rules dealing with hearsay are such that
application of the particular rules can yield only one correct result."'); State v. Ortiz, 981 P.2d
1127, 1135 (Haw. 1999) (holding trial court should determine whether specific requirements of
the rule were met); State v. Moore, 921 P.2d 122, 137 (Haw. 1996) (quoting Kealoha v. County
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applied to all conclusions of law and has been equated with a de novo
standard of review. 250 Despite the fact that Hawaiian courts explain that
there should be no discretion in deciding whether the requirements of a
particular hearsay rule or exception are met, they also note one category in
hearsay rules that should be left to the trial courts discretion:

"trustworthiness. "251
The Hawaii courts recognize that there are several instances when
a trial court is in a better position to make a "judgment call." 252 Thus, the
standard of review used in those cases is abuse of discretion.253 Hawaii self
identifies as using a de novo standard of review to hearsay rulings, yet

carves out a common-sense exception for abuse of discretion when the trial
court must
listen to witness testimony and review documents for
reliability. 254
3. Hybrid Approach of De Novo Review and Abuse of Discretion
Most federal and state jurisdictions that have broken down the
standard of evaluating hearsay rulings into multiple layers of review, as
opposed to simply using abuse of discretion or de novo.
These
jurisdictions list two issues to review: (1) whether the statement is hearsay,
which is reviewed de novo, and (2) whether an exception to the hearsay

of Hawaii, 844 P.2d 670, 675 (Haw. 1993)) ("[W]here the admissibility of evidence is determined
by application of the hearsay rule, there can be only one correct result, and the appropriate
standard for appellate review is the right/wrong standard."); State v. Sale, 133 P.3d 815, 824
(Haw. Ct. App. 2006) ("We apply the right/wrong standard of review to a trial court's decision to
admit or exclude evidence based on its application of the hearsay rule.").
250 See Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co. of Hawaii, Inc. v. Mijo, 950 P.2d 1219, 1228 (Haw. 1998)
(citing State v. Soto, 933 P.2d 66, 73 (Haw. 1997)) ("A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed
under the clearly erroneous standard, whereas its conclusions of law are reviewed under the
right/wrong or de novo standard.").
251 See, e.g., State v. Haili, 79 P.3d 1263, 1274 (Haw. 2003) ("Similarly, this court will
review the circuit court's determination of trustworthiness under HRE Rules 804(b)(5) and
804(b)(8) for an abuse of discretion."); State v. Christian, 967 P.2d 239, 250 (Haw. 1998)
(applying abuse of discretion standard to review determination that evidence was untrustworthy);
State v. Jhun, 927 P.2d. 1355, 1360 n.4 (Haw. 1996) (applying de novo review to admissibility of
evidence under public records exception); State v. Forman, 263 P.3d 127, 132 (Haw. Ct. App.
2011) (applying de novo review for business records exception). The court noted that the
question of whether there was evidence of a "lack of trustworthiness" under the rule would be
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Jhun, 927 P.2d at 1360 n.4.
252 Jhun, 927 P.2d at 1360 n.4.
253 Id. ("If, instead, the trial court had based its ruling on the 'judgment call' of whether the
sources of information or other circumstances indicated a lack of trustworthiness, then we would
review the trial court's ruling according to the abuse of discretion standard.").
254 See Juhn, 927 P.2d at 1360 n.4 (laying out the abuse of discretion standard).
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rule applies, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.255 This standard
has been most clearly, repeatedly, and simply stated in the United States
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, including a recent articulation of the rule in
United States v. Dwyer:25 6 "[w]e exercise plenary review over the question

whether a statement is hearsay, and review257
for abuse of discretion a district
,
exceptions.
hearsay
of
application
court's
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits, as discussed earlier, appear to have a
lack of clarity as to what standard of review should apply. On many
occasions, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits use a two-part test. The appellate
courts review (1) "[w]hether a district court correctly construed the hearsay

rule" as a "question of law [that] we review de novo" and (2) "a district
court's decision to admit evidence as non-hearsay for an abuse of

discretion.

,25

In Florida, the courts break the inquiry down by explaining that the
"question of whether evidence falls within the statutory definition of
hearsay is a question of law. 2 5 9 Although it's unclear why a jurisdiction
would create a rule like this, the two-part test does emphasize that
deciphering the hearsay definition involves purely statutory interpretation
whereas the exceptions involve many fact and credibility determinations.
This is similar to the jurisdictions described above that call for a de novo
review of hearsay rulings and who break from that general rule and use
clear error or abuse of discretion review when exploring certain
exceptions.260 In the jurisdictions that ask both questions of (1) "is it
hearsay?" and (2) "does an exception apply?," all of the exceptions are
lumped into one category, which necessarily involves fact finding. 2 6'

255 See, e.g., United States v. Price, 458 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2006) ("Whether a statement
is hearsay is a legal question subject to plenary review . . . . If the district court correctly
classifies a statement as hearsay, its application of the relevant hearsay exceptions is subject to
review for abuse of discretion."); United States v. Washington, 462 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir.
2006) (offering de novo standard of review for abuse of discretion); United States v. Gibson, 409
F.3d 325, 337 (6th Cir. 2005) (offering standard of review).
256 No. 05-3140, 2012 WL 2948189 (3d Cir. July 20, 2012).
257 See id. at *3 (articulating standard of review for hearsay rulings); see also United States
v. Johnson, 449 F. App'x 149, 151 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating court has plenary review and standard
looks for abuse of discretion); United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 98 (3d Cir. 2002) ("We review
for abuse of discretion."); United States v. Sallins, 993 F.2d 344, 346 (3d Cir. 1993) (reviewing
hearsay evidence as question of law subject to plenary review).
258 Washington, 462 F.3d at 1135 (outlining de novo standard); see also Gibson, 409 F.3d at
337 (outlining abuse of discretion standard).
259 K.V. v. State, 832 So.2d 264, 265 (Fla. App. 2002) (specifying standard for determining
if trial court erred in its hearsay ruling).
260 See Bernadyn v. State, 887 A.2d 602, 606 (Md. 2005) (discussing standards of review for
hearsay issues of law).
261 See id. (outlining questions presented for hearsay review).
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However, the two-part test that requires de novo review of that first
question fails to take into account that there might be fact or credibility
determinations in deciding if a statement fits the definition.262 For
example, deciding whether a statement is offered for the truth of the matter
asserted might require a trial judge to listen to the witness explain the
context and meaning of the statement and make a judgment call on what
the statement's true purpose was. 2 63 Additionally, reviewing the second
question of whether an exception is met might certainly involve the legal
interpretation of the statute or prior case law, which interprets the
26 For example, the decision of whether a statement was made
exception. 264
to show "intent, plan, motive" for purposes of Rule 803(3) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence might involve a comparison of the hearsay statement
being offered at trial to one that was found, as a matter of law, to be for
purposes of plan or motive in prior cases and might not have
anything to do
265
with a disagreement in facts at trial or witness credibility.
The next three tests were all written broadly and ambiguously. The
tests are broad enough that courts can take into account legal
determinations and factual determinations at any point in the analysis of
whether a statement is admissible over a hearsay objection, regardless of
whether the legal issues involve defining hearsay or applying an
266
exception. 2 6 However, the tests were also written2 6 vaguely
enough that
7
they provide no true guidance to the appellate courts.

4. Two-Part Test of Clear Error and De Novo - Nebraska and
Oregon
Nebraska and Oregon courts use similar two-part tests for
reviewing hearsay rulings. The appellate courts (1) review for clear error
the factual findings underpinning a trial court's hearsay ruling and (2)
262 See State v. Dullard, 668 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Iowa 2003) (citing United States v. McGlory,
968 F.2d 309, 332 (3d Cir. 1992)) ("[T]he question whether a particular statement constitutes
hearsay presents a legal issue.").
263 Washington, 462 F.3 d at 1135 (analyzing judge's role in hearsay rulings); United States v.
Gibson, 409 F.3d 325, 337 (6th Cir. 2005) (same).
264 See infra Part V.B.3 (analyzing hybrid approach of de novo review and abuse of

discretion).
265 See FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (allowing state of mind as hearsay exception); Wilks
v. State,
983 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. App. 1998) (determining whether statements representing witness's
state of mind were admissibile under hearsay exception).
266 See State v. Workman, 122 P.3d 639, 642 (Utah 2005) (presenting three-part test); see
also discussion infra Part V.B.4-6 (explaining three-part test).
267 See Workman, 122 P.3d at 642 (declining to elaborate three-part test). See generally
discussion infra Part V.B.4-6 (discussing lack of specificity when courts analyze hearsay rulings).
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review de novo the court's ultimate determination to admit evidence over a
hearsay objection. 268 The Nebraska Supreme Court explained its two-part
test in State v. McCave26 9 when it held that the "reasoning for adopting a de
novo standard
applies equally to a court's exclusion of evidence on hearsay
S,,270
grounds.
In other words, the court clarified that it would review de
novo the court's ruling by evaluating whether the court admitted evidence,
despite a hearsay objection, or excluded evidence because of hearsay. 271
This two-step standard of review began its evolution in 1993 when
the Nebraska Supreme Court explicitly overruled cases applying an abuse
of discretion standard to review rulings under the excited utterances
exception to hearsay.272 This State v. Jacob273 opinion cited two cases, In
re Interest of R.A. and VA. 274 and State v. Lee,275 that held as recently as
1987 that "the determination as to the admissibility of an excited utterance
generally rests within the discretion of the trial court and that the trial
court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that
discretion., 276 In Jacob, the Nebraska Supreme Court clarified that these
holdings were "an outgrowth of the regrettably overly broad and recently
rejected expression that the admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter
left largely to the discretion of the trial court" and, therefore, overruled
those cases.277
Shortly after issuing the Jacob decision, the Nebraska Supreme
Court carved out an exception in State v. Toney278 and identified one
example where an abuse of discretion review should apply to hearsay
rulings: the residual exception. 279 In Toney, the Court explained that a trial
268 State v. Reinhart, 811 N.W.2d 258, 261 (Neb. 2012) (introducing two-part test); see also
State v. McCave, 805 N.W.2d 290, 305 (Neb. 2011) (outlining standard of review).
269 805 N.W.2d 290.
270 Id. at 3 16 (explaining standard of review for admittance and exclusion of hearsay).
271 Id. (clarifying decision to use de novo standard).
272 State v. Jacob, 494 N.W.2d 109, 118 (Neb. 1993) ("Thus, language in cases ... which

suggests that the admission of an excited utterance is left to the discretion of the trial court rather
than being controlled by § 27-803(1), is overruled.")
273 494 N.W.2d 109.
274 403 N.W.2d 357 (Neb. 1987), overruled by State v. Jacob, 494 N.W.2d 109 (Neb. 1993).
275 341 N.W.2d 600 (Neb. 1983), overruled by State v. Jacob, 494 N.W.2d 109 (Neb. 1993).
276 Jacob, 494 N.W.2d at 117 (citing In re Interest of R.A. and VA., 403 N.W.2d at 362 and
Lee, 341 N.W.2d at 604) (holding determination as to admissibility of excited utterance rests with
trial court).
277 Id. at 117-18 (rejecting notion that admission or exclusion of evidence left largely to
discretion of trial court).
278 498 N.W.2d 544 (Neb. 1993).
279 Id. at 551 ("Thus, an appellate court, reviewing a trial court's ruling on admissibility
under Rule 804(2)(e), will affirm the trial court's ruling unless the trial court has abused its
discretion concerning admissibility."); see FED. R. EVID. 807 (stating residual exception); NEB. R.
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court must weigh in on a multitude of factors to make the determination as
to whether to admit evidence under this exception necessarily involved
judicial discretion. 2810 Inreference to a United States Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals case, Toney lists five factors that a trial court must weigh: "a
statement's trustworthiness, materiality of the statement, probative
importance of the statement, interests of justice, and whether notice of the
' 281
statement's prospective use as evidence was given to an opponent. ,
Interestingly, similar carved out rules for reviewing trial court
determinations of "trustworthiness" for an abuse of discretion are also
found in the state jurisdictions that use a de novo review.282
Similar to Nebraska, the Oregon courts use a two-part standard of
review that "controls [how to] review a 'trial court evidentiary ruling [as to
whether] a statement fits within an exception to the hearsay rule. -'83 First,
the court will uphold the trial court's preliminary factual determinations if
any evidence in the record supports those determinations .284 The Supreme
Court recently explained that, "if the trial court does not make findings on
pertinent facts, and there is conflicting evidence, we will presume that the
trial court found facts in a manner consistent with its ultimate
conclusion.2 25 The Supreme Court gives two examples where fact-finding
by a trial court would be common: (1) whether "there were conflicting
evidence as to when, relative to the 'startling event,' a declarant made a
statement for purposes of [the excited utterance exception under] OEC
803(2)" and (2) "whether a witness had a motive to falsely ascribe an
inculpatory statement to the declarant under [the statement against interest
exception found in] OEC 804(3)(c), we would presume that the trial court
resolved those factual disputes consistently with its ultimate evidentiary
ruling., 28 6 Second, the Oregon appellate court reviews the trial court's
final legal conclusion de novo. The court determines "whether the hearsay
EVID. 804(2)(e) (setting forth residual exception).
28o Toney, 498 N.W.2d at 551.
281 Id. at 550-51 (citing Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 292-95 (7th Cir. 1979))
(listing factors trial court must weigh before exercising judicial discretion).
282 See supra Section V.B.2.d (discussing Hawaiian cases).
283 State v. Cazares-Mendez, 227 P.3d 172, 180-81 (Or. 2010) (quoting State v. Cook, 135
P.3d 260, 264 (Or. 2006)) (outlining two-part standard for evidentiary rulings), review allowed,
243 P.3d 69 (Or. 2010), affd., 256 P.3d 104 (Or. 2011); see also Cook, 135 P.3d at 264 (same).
284 Cook, 135 P.3d at 264 (citing State v. Cunningham, 99 P.3d 271, 277 (Or. 2004)) (stating
when factual determinations are upheld).
285 Cazares-Aendez, 227 P.3d at 180 (internal citations omitted) (citing State v. Carlson, 808
P.2d 1002, 1010 (Or. 1991)) (discussing result of two-part standard).
286 Id. (articulating trial court's review of conflicting evidence of shocking events); see FED.
R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (employing similar language to statement against interest exception in OR.
EVID. CODE 804(3)(C)).
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statement is admissible under an exception
to the hearsay rule to determine
287
if the trial court made an error of law.,,
Nebraska and Oregon courts both identify a two-part test
specifically for hearsay rulings that examines both questions of fact and
law. An abuse of discretion standard is never mentioned for hearsay
rulings in the Oregon courts. 288 However, the Nebraska courts noted the
unique quality of the residual exception, which involves trustworthiness,
reliability, and credibility determinations traditionally left to discretion of
trial court.289
5. Three-Tiered Approach of De Novo, Clear Error, and Abuse of
Discretion - Utah
The standard of review for evidentiary rulings on hearsay has also
been problematic in Utah. For example, in the 1980's the Supreme Court
applied two different standards of review to a finding of admissibility of
hearsay evidence under the existing mental, emotional, or physical
condition. 290 Further, the Supreme Court apparently disagreed with itself
again in 1989 when reviewing whether evidence should be admitted under
the excited utterance exception.29'
In the 1990's the Utah Supreme Court recognized this problem.
The Utah Supreme Court noted that these variations arise because the
exceptions to Utah's version of Rule 803 vary the trial court's analysis

between factual issues, legal issues, and a mixture of both.292 As a result,
"the appropriate standard of review of a trial court's decision admitting or
excluding evidence under Rules 802 and 803 depends on the particular
287
288

Cook, 135 P.3d at 264 (setting out second part of two-part test).
See Cazares-Mendez, 227 P.3d at 180 (excluding abuse of discretion standard from

discussion); Cook, 13 P.3d at 264 (same).
289 State v. Toney, 498 N.W.2d 544, 551 (Neb. 1993) (describing second part of two-part
test); see discussion supraPart V.B.4 (elucidating two-part test applied in Oregon and Nebraska).
290 Compare State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah 1989), and State v. Auble, 754 P.2d
935, 937 (Utah 1988) (applying correctness standard to finding of admissibility under Rule
803(3)), with State v. Kaytso, 684 P.2d 63, 64 (Utah 1984) (holding no "abuse of prerogative"
occurred when court admitted evidence under Rule 63(4) (now 803(3))).
291 Compare State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Utah 1989) (applying clear error standard
to find that statement did not fall within Rule 803(2)), with State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445, 449
(Utah 1989) (stating whether evidence meets requirements of Rule 803(2) are within "sound
discretion" of trial court).
292 See Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977, 978 n.4 (Utah 1993) (noting trial court determination
contains a "number of rulings"); see also State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.l (Utah
1993) (stating admissibility decisions are the "sum of several rulings"). "[E]ach [separate ruling]
of which may be reviewed under a separate standard" of review. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1270
n.1l.
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ruling in dispute.,
Ultimately, Utah has developed what it calls a three-tiered standard

of review.294 Utah courts have recognized that their standard of review
regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence is complicated because
multiple rulings within each determination require a different standard of

review. 295 In sum, courts in Utah (1) review legal questions for correctness
or legal error under a de novo review; (2) review questions of fact for clear
error; and (3) review the final ruling on admissibility for abuse of
discretion.296
This paradigm allows the Utah appellate courts to have the ability
to review each individual ruling for its function over form in each
particular ruling. The advantage of the three-tiered system of review is that
the appellate courts are forced to consider each layer of review as it relates
to each individual finding of the trial court.2 9 7 Also, the three-tiered
standard ends with abuse of discretion, which emphasizes the trial court's
traditional role of original gatekeeper regarding evidentiary issues.298
6. No Bright-Line Rule in Connecticut?
In a somewhat confusing opinion that best encapsulates the conflict
and confusion underlying the question of what standard of review should
apply to hearsay rulings, the Supreme Court of Connecticut seems to adopt
a de novo standard of review rule for pure hearsay questions by definition,
but then actually applies an abuse of discretion standard to the facts of the
case. 299 The Supreme Court of Connecticut claims that it is not adopting
293 Hansen, 852 P.2d at 978 (indicating factual or legal determination invokes certain
standard of review).
294 State v. C.D.L., 250 P.3d 69, 79 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Workman, 122 P.3d

639, 642 (Utah 2005)) ("In reviewing the admissibility of hearsay, legal conclusions are reviewed
for correctness, factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, and the ultimate question of
admissibility is reviewed for abuse of discretion.").
295 Workman, 122 P.3d at 642 (pointing to complexity of standard of review for various
reasons).
296 Id.

297 See id. (approving three-tiered approach).
298 See id. ("[F]inally, we review the district court's ruling on admissibility for abuse of
discretion.").
299 State v. Saucier, 926 A.2d 633, 641 (Conn. 2007) (emphasis added) ("[A]fter a trial court
has made the legal determination [regarding whether] a particular statement is or is not hearsay,
or is subject to a hearsay exception, is ... [can] .. .admit or ...bar the evidence based upon
relevancy, prejudice, or other ... grounds ....). The court determined that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it decided that the statement was hearsay and was not admissible
under any exception. Id. at 636. The trial court's interpretation of the victim's statement requires
the appellate court to review rulings using an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 645.
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any bright line rule. g00 Yet, the court holds that it will apply a different
standard1 of review depending on the context of each specific hearsay
30
ruling.
One ruling that came under review was the trial court's decision to
exclude evidence that did not meet Connecticut's definition of a statement
of then-existing mental or emotional condition exception.302
The
intermediate appellate court engaged in plenary review of the trial court's
ruling and upheld the decision to exclude the evidence.30 3 The first issue
on appeal was to clarify which standard of review was required to review
the trial court's ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence pursuant to
an exception to the hearsay rule.30 4 In what is probably the most ironic line
of this confusing opinion, the majority recognized "that the decisions by
our appellate courts have not been a model of 30clarity
in this regard and we
5
take this opportunity to resolve the confusion.
This case is also notable because an en banc panel of seven justices
heard the case and, despite the fact that the judgment of the intermediate
appellate court was unanimously affirmed, Justice Norcott authored a
concurring opinion that solely addressed and disagreed with the standard of
review decision made in the majority opinion. 30 6 There are many issues
that create the overarching confusion that serves as the backdrop for this
case, including the fact that the majority opinion upholds the trial court
decision to exclude evidence under a hearsay exception because it holds
"the trial court did not abuse its discretion." 30 7 Additionally, the majority
opinion affirms the intermediate appellate court on the exclusion of the
evidence but writes to "clarify" the proper standard of review, which it

300
301
302

Id. at 641.
Id. (rejecting bright line rule and opting for standard dependent on specific context).
Saucier v. Warden, State Prison, No. CV-054000607, 2010 WL 4276740, at *4 (Conn.

Super. Sept. 24, 2010) (describing trial court's reasoning). Compare CONN. CODE OF EVID. 83(4) ("A statement of the declarant's then-existing mental or emotional condition ... provided
that the statement is a natural expression of the condition and is not a statement of memory or
belief to prove the fact remembered or believed."), with FED. R. EVID. 803(3) ("A statement of
the declarant's then-existing state of mind ... or emotional, sensory, or physical condition.., but
not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it
relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will.").
303 State v. Saucier, 876 A.2d 572, 581 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (quoting State v. Gonzalez,
815 A.2d 1261, 1270 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003)) ("Whether evidence offered at trial is admissible
pursuant to one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule presents a question of law. Accordingly, our
review of the state's claim is plenary."), aff'd, 926 A.2d 633 (Conn. 2007).
304Saucier, 926 A.2d at 638 (clarifying standard of review).
305 Id. at 638-39 (attempting to clarify decision).
306 Id. at 651-56 (Norcott, J., concurring) (disagreeing with standard of review decision made
by majority).
307 Id. at 636 (majority opinion) (laying out issues causing confusion).
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claims the intermediate appellate court got wrong, even though the majority
opinion ultimately applies the exact same abuse of discretion standard to
the ruling.308 In addition, three of the seven justices are part of a
concurring opinion that upholds the ruling that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion but write separately to disagree with the majority opinion's
articulation of the what standard of review should be used because the
author of the concurring opinion states, "we should review all purely
evidentiary claims, including determinations of whether out-of-court
statements are hearsay, solely for abuse of the trial court's discretion. "309
To examine the opinion, the court tries to clarify the incredibly
perplexing issue of selecting the proper standard of review. The majority
begins its legal reasoning by stating, "whether a challenged statement
properly may be classified as hearsay and whether a hearsay exception
31
properly is identified are legal questions demanding plenary review. , 0
The court further explains that these questions require deciding issues of
unanimous support and call for the trial court to never admit hearsay
without an explicit provision for its admissibility. 311
These are almost textbook definitions of de novo review.
However, the dilemma still remains as to what standard should be used.
The court claims that it "decline[s] to adopt a categorical de novo or abuse
of discretion standard because application of either standard will afford
unwarranted deference in some cases and unwarranted interference in
others ....,,32 The court then goes on to "conclude that the appropriate

standard of review is best determined, not as a strict bright line rule, but as

one driven by the specific nature of the claim.

,313

The Supreme Court of Connecticut further added to the disarray
when it described how it viewed the split among jurisdictions regarding
how evidentiary rulings addressing admissibility under the hearsay rule and
its exceptions should be reviewed. 3 " Although the opinion addresses the
split in authority and fairly lists the jurisdictions in categories of whether
they use (1) an abuse of discretion, (2) a de novo, (3) a "hybrid," or (4)
jurisdictions that "have recognized that the function performed by the trial
court in issuing its ruling should dictate the scope of review," the opinion
can confuse readers as to what jurisdictions are truly compiled in each

Id. at 638.
Id. at 650 (Norcott, J., concurring).
310 Saucier, 926 A.2d at 641 (majority opinion) (determining appropriate standard of review).
308
309

311
312
313
314

Id. (discouraging trial courts from admitting hearsay on frivolous grounds).
Id. at 640 (explaining court's rationale behind declining to adopt categorical standards).
Id. at 641 (stating bright line rule as inappropriate).
Id. at 641.
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category. 315 As detailed throughout this paper, the categorization of
jurisdictions by their standard of review can, at times, be challenging.
Aside from any disagreement as to what jurisdiction falls into
which category, the main confusion in the opinion seems to be that the
court goes to great lengths to claim that it is not creating any bright line
rule. Yet when comparing the application and justification of its "no bright
line rule" to what happens in other jurisdictions, after Saucier, Connecticut
has done one of two actions. The court either (a) adopts a de novo standard
that recognizes a couple of rare exceptions that call for underlying factfinding or credibility assessments, as most of the states do that adopt the de
novo rule, or, (b) as recognized by the concurring opinion,
"the majority..
316
[adopts] a bright line rule.., the hybrid approach."
To determine which standard of review is actually articulated by
the majority, the reasons that the court claims to reject a de novo review for
hearsay should first be reviewed. Notably, the court lists a couple of
exceptions to hearsay that would require fact-finding and credibility
assessments.31 7 The examples listed are (1) "whether a statement is truly
spontaneous as to fall within the spontaneous utterance exception will be
reviewed with the utmost deference to the trial court's determination," and
(2) "a trial court's conclusion that a hearsay statement bears the requisite
indicia of trustworthiness and reliability necessary for admission under the
residual exception to the hearsay rule, which would be reviewed for an
318
abuse of discretion."
As to the first example, the District of Columbia, which is listed in
the majority opinion as a jurisdiction using the de novo standard and whose
de novo approach to reviewing trial court's hearsay rulings is rejected by
the majority, has on numerous occasions recognized that the determination

315

Id. at 639-42 nn.8-10 (commenting on use of different standards of review in various

jurisdictions). Florida is a hybrid jurisdiction, while Oregon uses the de novo standard. Id. at 640
n.10, 642. Oregon uses a fairly straight-forward two-part inquiry in deciding fact questions for
clear error and reviews de novo the legal conclusions. Id. at 642 n.9. Oregon is not a jurisdiction
that simply uses a de novo standard to review hearsay. Id. Hawaii is a state that uses the "no
bright line" approach that Saucier attempts to align itself with, however, Hawaii is more fairly
characterized as one that uses a de novo standard, as discussed supra Section Part V.B.2.d. Id. at
642; see discussed supra Section Part V.B.2.d.
316 See State v. Saucier, 926 A.2d 633, 641 (Conn. 2007) ("Accordingly, we conclude that

the appropriate standard of review is best determined, not as a strict bright line rule, but as one
driven by the specific nature of the claim."); discussion supra Part V.B.2 (discussing rare
exceptions for de novo review).
317 Saucier, 926 A.2d at 641 ("Similarly, appellate courts will defer to the trial court's
determinations on issues dictated by the exercise of discretion, fact finding, or credibility

assessments.").
318 Id. (offering examples of hearsay exception).
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of whether a statement meets the excited or spontaneous utterance
exception will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.3 19 In Hawaii, the
courts have adopted a "right/wrong" or de novo standard as a general rule
for reviewing hearsay, yet the Hawaii courts recognize that questions of
"trustworthiness" call for an abuse of discretion review.3 20 For example, to
meet certain hearsay exceptions like the business records, public records
and reports, or the residual exception, the rule explicitly requires
"trustworthiness" in the evidence.3 21 Therefore, even jurisdictions that selfidentify as jurisdictions that use the de novo standard as a general rule to
review hearsay rulings note this exception to the rule.
To add some confusion to what standard or rule is being advanced
by the majority, the concurring opinion describes how the majority's
articulation of its standard of review for hearsay is one that is actually a
hybrid rule where the court must answer two questions with two different
standards of review: de novo and abuse of discretion.3 22 The concurring
opinion describes the majority's hybrid rule using the following two-step
inquiry. 32
First, the court must determine whether the statement
categorized as hearsay is a question of law that the trial court determined
after analyzing whether a particular statement is or is not hearsay or is
subject to a hearsay exception.3 24 Second, the court "is vested with the
discretion to admit or to bar the evidence
based upon relevancy, prejudice,
3 25
or other legally appropriate grounds.",
The concurring opinion's description is not actually a hybrid
319See id. at 640 ("We therefore decline to adopt a categorical de novo or abuse of discretion
standard."); Odenms v. United States, 901 A.2d 770, 776 (D.C. 2006) (differentiating when to
review under clearly erroneous and abuse of discretion); see also Graure v. United States, 18
A.3d 743, 755 (D.C. 2011) (same), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 360 (2011); Melendez v. United
States, 26 A.3d 234, 245 (D.C. 2011) (describing excited utterance exception to hearsay rule);
State v. Jacob, 494 N.W.2d 109, 118 (Neb. 1993) (overruling use of abuse of discretion review
for excited utterance exception).
320 See supra Part V.B.2.d.
321 Compare HAW. R. EVID. 803(b)(6) ("unless the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness."), with FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (containing language
of "indicate lack of trustworthiness" as contained in Hawaii rule); compare HAW. R. EVID.
803(b)(8) ("unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness."), with FED. R. EVID. 803(8) (containing exact same language as Hawaii rule);
compare HAW. R. EVID. 804(b)(8) ("A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness .... "), with FED.
R. EVID. 807(a)(1) ("A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule.").
322 See State v. Saucier, 926 A.2d 633, 651 n.4 (Conn. 2007) (Norcott, J., concurring)
(rejecting defendant's claims of improper hearsay rulings in appellate court).
323 Id. at 651 n.4 (describing two-step process for hybrid rule).
324 Id. at 641 (majority opinion).
325 See id. at 651 n.4 (Norcott, J., concurring) (proposing hybrid rule).

50

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XVIII

approach to reviewing hearsay rulings but is a de novo approach to
reviewing hearsay and an abuse of discretion standard to review on grounds
of relevance, prejudice, or other non-hearsay grounds. Jurisdictions that
apply a hybrid standard to review hearsay rulings typically decide the two
basic questions that must be answered solely for the hearsay determination
under two different standards: first, whether a statement is hearsay, which
is reviewed de novo, and, second, whether an exception applies to the
hearsay rule, which is reviewed for abuse of discretion.3 26 This more
accurate characterization of the hybrid approach to reviewing hearsay is
noted in the concurring opinion when it cites several cases and
parentheticals from those cases articulating this approach. 327
The concurring opinion emphasizes why, by definition, the
majority uses a de novo review for the hearsay rulings by noting the two
underlying questions for most hearsay rulings: whether the statement is
hearsay and whether an exception applies.3 28 The majority opinion states
that these are legal questions that require decision-making that reasonable
minds do not disagree about.3 2 9 The concurring opinion states that the
court should "evaluate both determinations under the abuse of discretion
,,330
standard of review.
In addition to the plain reading of the opinion itself, courts that
have applied Saucier seem to recognize that, in reviewing a hearsay ruling,
the two questions that must be answered are reviewed de novo. 33 1 As an
example, three years later, the Connecticut Supreme Court started its
discussion of the standard of review of evidentiary rulings with the belief
that its standard of review for admissibility of evidence is fully settled.332
The court quotes Saucier and lists as an example that, "'whether a
challenged statement properly may be classified as hearsay and whether a
hearsay exception properly is identified are legal questions demanding
plenary review. -333 Therefore, it appears that the rule articulated by the
Connecticut Supreme Court and as taken from Saucier is that both
questions of whether a statement is hearsay and whether an exception

326 See supra Part V.B.3 (discussing hybrid approach of de novo review and abuse of
discretion).
327 Saucier, 926 A.2d at 656 n.12 (Norcott, J., concurring).
328 Id. at 650 n.2 ("I agree that the trial court first should determine whether the proffered

statement is hearsay before considering the applicability of any hearsay exceptions.").
329 Id. at 641 (majority opinion).
330 Id. at 650 n.2 (Norcott, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (disagreeing with majority
evaluation of hearsay exception).
331 State v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1092 (Conn. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1474 (2011).
332 Id. (stating standard of review does not require clarifying).
333

Id. (quoting Saucier, 926 A.2d at 641).
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applies are legal questions and that neither determination is owed any
deference to the trial court.33 4 As applied-and as has been applied in other
courts using a de novo review-some questions inherent in hearsay rulings
require fact-finding and credibility determinations. 335
If the Saucier court clarifies anything, it is that the debate over the
proper standard of review to employ when reviewing hearsay rulings is
ongoing and confusing. Even in a case where the ultimate decision of the
trial court to exclude evidence is upheld under an abuse of discretion
rationale, the Connecticut Supreme Court is split, four-three.336 The
Supreme Court of Connecticut continues to struggle as to whether some
vague "no bright-line" rule or standard that is amorphous and applied
inconsistently in future cases by the same court or whether an abuse of
discretion should always be applied to all evidentiary rulings.332
VI. CONCLUSION
A review of all of the various tests shows that a few areas of
commonality emerge. First, all of the jurisdictions seem to recognize that
there are both fact and legal determinations that must be made when
evaluating hearsay. Even the jurisdictions that call for an abuse of
discretion level of review often will define abuse of discretion to include a
de novo review of the legal conclusions and a clear error review for the
factual conclusions of the court below. In addition, even the jurisdictions
that call for de novo review recognize many circumstances where there
must be fact finding by the trial court that is entitled to deference. Most of
the jurisdictions recognize that hearsay presents unique problems that make
it difficult to use one label or rule for its standard of review. Also, all of
the various tests have limitations.
Before examining the limitations, each test has some advantages.
An abuse of discretion level of review comes with two major positives.
First, this standard of review recognizes all of the benefits of deferring to a
trial court's expertise and experience in evaluating the evidence in the
context of the trial. This rationale has been the traditional and historic
reason why evidentiary rulings are given deference by appellate courts.
Second, the abuse of discretion standard of review encompasses an
appellate court's ability to review both legal and fact questions. The

334 See Id. at 650 (asserting legal questions require plenary review without deference to trial

court).
335 See generally id. at 649 (discussing nuances of de novo review).
336 Saucier, 926 A.2d at 633.
337 See id. (indicating court split).
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United States Supreme Court has instructed that "little turns ... on whether
we label review ... abuse of discretion or de novo [because] .. .a district
court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an errorof law."338
This seems to settle it. If abuse of discretion allows an appellate
court to review legal conclusions as potential errors of law with the same
result regardless of which standard is used, then appellate courts could
simply use this standard and review legal conclusions for error of law and
all other determinations for abuse of discretion or clear error. However,
appellate courts have deviated from doing this, as illustrated by the
different tests outlined above. The most likely reasons why the courts have

created new tests that explicitly outline a use of de novo review as part of
that test is that a different understanding of how abuse of discretion is
defined, in spite of the instructions from the United States Supreme Court,
or the prevailing thought that abuse of discretion is simply a rubber stamp
of the trial court's ruling.
In some jurisdictions, abuse of discretion has been defined as
meaning more than an error of law, and other courts have explained that

"[w]hen a court's judgment is based on an erroneous interpretation of the
law, an abuse of discretion standard is not appropriate."33 9 The notion that
an abuse of discretion standard is simply a rubber stamp is detailed above
in Part II.D.4 and is well-documented by Judge Markus.34 ° Judge Markus
explains how abuse of discretion has been defined as only occurring when
"the trial court's attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable"
or "only if no reasonable judge could logically make that decision. ,341
338 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (emphasis added) (citing Cooter & Gell

v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)) (providing example of abuse of discretion).
339 See Am.'s Floor Source, L.L.C. v. Joshua Homes, 946 N.E.2d 799, 807 (Ohio Ct. App.
2010) (citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 450 N.E.2d 1140, 1141 (Ohio 1983)) ("An abuse of
discretion is more than an error of law or in judgment; rather, it implies that the trial court's
attitude was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable."); State v. Futrall, 918 N.E.2d 497, 498
(Ohio 2009) (quoting Swartzentruber v. Orrville Grace Brethren Church, 836 N.E.2d 619, 621
(Ohio. Ct. App. 2005)) (reviewing under abuse of discretion standard).
340 J. Richard M. Markus, A Better Standardfor Reviewing Discretion, 2004 UTAH L. REV.
1279, 1279 (2004) ([A]ppellate courts seemingly give themselves unlimited discretion when
they decide whether a trial court abused its discretion.").
341 Id. (citing Best v. Yerkes, 77 N.W.2d 23, 33 (Iowa 1956)) (upholding trial court because
did not act unfairly, arbitrarily, or unreasonably in denying motion); Zajac v. Old Republic Ins.
Co., 372 N.W.2d 897, 899 (N.D. 1985) (holding abuse of discretion implies trial court had
"unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude"); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc.,
701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985) (stating test for abuse of discretion is whether trial court's
act was arbitrary or unreasonable); Marrs v. Bd. of Med., 375 N.W.2d 321, 324 (Mich. 1985)
(explaining abuse of discretion requires result grossly erroneous in fact and logic); Barrett v. Mo.
Pac. R.R. Co., 688 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (stating abuse occurs only when ruling
is against logic and reasonable people could not disagree); Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 482
N.E.2d 1248, 1252 (Ohio 1985) (same). The abuse of discretion "evidences not the exercise of
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When comparing the abuse of discretion standard, which has been
interpreted to overturn rulings only if the trial judge is illogical, with the
standard from Saucierthat claims hearsay is not an issue where reasonable
minds can differ, it becomes clear why appellate courts are reluctant to
adopt a wholesale abuse of discretion review.342
Turning next to the advantages of the other five tests used to
review hearsay, they all are explicit in their instructions to the appellate
court to look for legal conclusions. However, the tests are not helpful
because they are either too narrow or too broad. For example, the
jurisdictions that use de novo review will almost always break from that
rule when convenient or even necessary. A rule is not particularly helpful
if the appellate court is free to break from it on a case-by-case basis. These
jurisdictions might as well have a rule similar to those in Nebraska or Utah,
which breaks down the various levels of review into findings of fact or law.
In addition, the rule asking courts to review whether hearsay exists as a
matter of law and whether an exception is met for the abuse of discretion
review seems to arbitrarily be breaking those determinations into broad
categories of law or fact when there are law and fact questions within each
inquiry.
Jurisdictions like Nebraska, Oregon, and Utah that tell the appellate
courts to review legal conclusions de novo and fact conclusions for clear
error get closer to a better rule because they recognize that the
determinations in a hearsay ruling encompass multiple layers of inquiry. In
Connecticut, which claims not to have a "bright line" rule, the advantage is
different. The appellate court in Connecticut is free to use its judgment to
figure out if there is a legal or fact question present, but again having no
rule is not entirely helpful.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
So what should appellate courts do when reviewing hearsay rulings
by trial courts below? I would recommend a return to the traditional abuse
of discretion standard with a true definition in line with Supreme Court
precedent in Koon that has been explained thoroughly by the Second
Circuit.343 This would also return the traditional deference afforded to trial

will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of
reason but rather passion of bias." Afarrs, 375 N.W.2d at 324 (citing Spalding v. Spalding, 94
N.W.2d 810, 811-12 (Mich. 1959)).
342 State v. Saucier, 926 A.2d 633, 650 (Conn. 2007) (Norcott, J., concurring) (illuminating
why appellate courts are reluctant to apply wholesale standards of review).
343 See United States v. Hasan, 586 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2009) (exercising abuse of
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courts on evidentiary rulings. For the traditional abuse of discretion
standard to work, each jurisdiction would have to define the standard
explicitly to include the line "a district court by definition abuses its
discretion when it makes an error of law. 344 The confusion noted by the
Sixth and Ninth Circuit would be easily resolved with a definition of abuse
of discretion that explicitly included this instruction. As one line from
Wagner stated, "it is not entirely clear whether construction of a hearsay
rule is a matter of discretion or a legal issue subject to de novo
review"would be rendered irrelevant because the "matter of discretion"

would necessarily include a de novo review of all legal Issues. 345

discretion standard); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (articulating abuse of
discretion standard).
344 Koon, 518 U.S. at 100 (emphasis added) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496
U.S. 384, 405 (1990)).
345 Wagner v. County of Maricopa, 701 F.3d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing
complexities of reviewing trial court's determinations).

